Ground dog day lessons don't have to be relearned in the use of dogs in combat by Hammerstrom, Michael L.
Calhoun: The NPS Institutional Archive
Theses and Dissertations Thesis Collection
2005-12
Ground dog day lessons don't have to
be relearned in the use of dogs in combat
Hammerstrom, Michael L.












Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited 
GROUND DOG DAY:  LESSONS DON’T HAVE TO BE 









 Thesis Advisor:                                         Anna Simons 





















THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 i
 REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE Form Approved OMB No. 0704-0188 
Public reporting burden for this collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including 
the time for reviewing instruction, searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and 
completing and reviewing the collection of information. Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any 
other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions for reducing this burden, to Washington 
headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports, 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 
1204, Arlington, VA 22202-4302, and to the Office of Management and Budget, Paperwork Reduction Project 
(0704-0188) Washington DC 20503. 
1. AGENCY USE ONLY (Leave blank) 
 
2. REPORT DATE  
December 2005 
3. REPORT TYPE AND DATES COVERED 
Master’s Thesis 
4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE:   
 Ground Dog Day:  Lessons Don’t Have to be Relearned in the Use of Dogs in 
Combat 
6. AUTHOR(S)  Michael L. Hammerstrom 
5. FUNDING NUMBERS 
7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) 
Naval Postgraduate School 
Monterey, CA  93943-5000 
8. PERFORMING 
ORGANIZATION REPORT 
NUMBER     
9. SPONSORING /MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) 
N/A 
10. SPONSORING/MONITORING 
     AGENCY REPORT NUMBER 
11. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES  The views expressed in this thesis are those of the author and do not reflect the official 
policy or position of the Department of Defense or the U.S. Government. 
12a. DISTRIBUTION / AVAILABILITY STATEMENT   
Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited 
12b. DISTRIBUTION CODE 
13. ABSTRACT (maximum 200 words)  
     Currently, the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan involve the US fighting insurgents.  The nature of the fight in highly populated 
areas negates traditional American strengths in technology and mechanization.  One of the potential tools in this fight is the 
expanded use of military working dogs (MWD), also called war dogs or K-9s.  The increased use of dogs on the battlefield has 
the potential to save lives.  The problem is that this lesson seems to have to be relearned with every prolonged conflict the US 
enters.  The delay by the military leadership recognizing dogs’ utility on the battlefield has historically cost US servicemen’s 
lives.   
     The purpose of this thesis is to determine whether lessons that have been learned could be applied to the current MWD 
program to enhance the effectiveness of using dogs in combat.  The intent is not to convince the reader that every lesson or 
particular conclusion or recommendation presented is the final solution to creating a “perfect” MWD program.  The aim, 
instead, is to offer a spectrum of options or alternative methods that may be of use to those involved in MWD programs and to 









15. NUMBER OF 
PAGES  
147 
14. SUBJECT TERMS   
Scout Dogs, Military Working Dogs, Dogs in the Military, Patrol Dogs, Working Dogs, Military 
Dogs, Mine Dogs, Dogs and Infantry, History of Dogs, Uses of Dogs, IEDs and Dogs, IED Detection, 

















NSN 7540-01-280-5500 Standard Form 298 (Rev. 2-89)  






















THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 iii
Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited 
 
 
GROUND DOG DAY:  LESSONS DON’T HAVE TO BE RELEARNED IN THE 
USE OF DOGS IN COMBAT 
 
Michael L. Hammerstrom 
Major, United States Army 
B.S., South Dakota School of Mines and Technology, 1994 
 
 
Submitted in partial fulfillment of the 
requirements for the degree of 
 
 























































Currently, the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan involve the US fighting insurgents.  
The nature of the fight in highly populated areas negates traditional American strengths 
in technology and mechanization.  One of the potential tools in this fight is the expanded 
use of military working dogs (MWD), also called war dogs or K-9s.  The increased use of 
dogs on the battlefield has the potential to save lives.  The problem is that this lesson 
seems to have to be relearned with every prolonged conflict the US enters.  The delay by 
the military leadership recognizing dogs’ utility on the battlefield has historically cost US 
servicemen’s lives.   
The purpose of this thesis is to determine whether lessons that have been learned 
could be applied to the current MWD program to enhance the effectiveness of using dogs 
in combat.  The intent is not to convince the reader that every lesson or particular 
conclusion or recommendation presented is the final solution to creating a “perfect” 
MWD program.  The aim, instead, is to offer a spectrum of options or alternative 
methods that may be of use to those involved in MWD programs and to suggest areas for 
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High-tech wizardry may have changed the look of today’s battlefield, but 
one thing will never change—the need for early detection of the enemy.  
For thousands of years, dogs have been in the front of men engaged in 
battle.  Military tradition dictates and demands that they will always be 
“Forever Forward.” (Lemish, 1996, p. xiv) 
Currently, the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan involve the US fighting insurgents.  
The nature of the fight in highly populated areas negates traditional American strengths 
in technology and mechanization.  The number of casualties from the conflicts continues 
to rise everyday and the military leadership continually calls for solutions to the threat 
that the insurgents pose to American military personnel.  One of the potential tools in this 
fight is the expanded use of military working dogs (MWD), also called war dogs or K-9s.   
B. THE PROBLEM 
The increased use of dogs on the battlefield has the potential to save lives.  The 
problem is that this lesson seems to have to be relearned with every prolonged conflict 
the US enters.  The reasons why these lessons have to be relearned are numerous but 
inexcusable, since delays by the military leadership in recognizing dogs’ utility on the 
battlefield have historically cost US servicemen’s lives.  Little has changed in the fifteen 
years since MAJ Denzil Frost wrote in his thesis, published by the US Army Command 
and General Staff College in 1990, that, “The canine’s or MWD’s nose offers significant 
potential because of its superior sensitivity to any other sensing device.  Unfortunately, 
the US today finds itself in the same familiar position [with a MWD program not 
equipped for the current conflict] as it has at similar points in history” (Frost, 1990, p.1). 
Jim Pettit, the dog program manager at the US Army Maneuver Support Center 
and Fort Leonard Wood, Missouri, echoes Frost’s views, 
Today and in the recent past the MP dogs have been great in force 
protection on the gates and health and welfare inspections/customs work, 
and bomb detection for the President.  As listed above the military needs 
to move dogs forward and put them in useful combat roles as was done in 
Vietnam.  The dog is still the detection asset it was back then.  
Improvement in training techniques and adaptability of breeds still keeps 
the dog as the gold standard for detection, tracking, etc.  Technology still  
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isn’t there.  I have heard technology will replace the dog for 20 years now. 
(Taken from a questionnaire response sent to the author by Jim Pettit on 
October 3, 2005) 
C. PURPOSE OF THE STUDY 
The purpose of this thesis is to determine whether lessons that have been learned 
could be applied to the current program to enhance the effectiveness of using dogs in 
combat.  The intent is not to convince the reader that every lesson or particular 
conclusion or recommendation presented is the final solution to creating a “perfect” 
MWD program.  The aim, instead, is to offer a spectrum of options or alternative 
methods that may be of use to those involved in MWD programs and to suggest areas for 
further research and exploration. 
D. BACKGROUND 
An earlier attempt to provide information about the MWD program was 
undertaken by Denzil Frost when he prepared his 1990 Master’s thesis, A Centralized 
Source of Information for the Military Working Dog Program, for the Army Command 
and General Staff College at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas.  He also used a questionnaire in 
an attempt to develop more information on the military dog program.  MAJ Frost had a 
problem similar to one I re-discovered during my research.  As Frost puts it, “Attempts to 
locate information about the MWD Program led mostly to military regulations, with very 
little information about training, management, procurement, or use by the Using 
Agencies” (Frost, 1990, p. 256).  Frost discovered that the responses he received covered 
the complete spectrum of what was wrong with the MWD Program at the time.  He found 
that it, “…was impossible to establish a consensus of opinion.  The Training Section 
blamed the procurement and management sections for the shortfall of trained dogs, or 
vice versa, depending on which group was queried”  (Frost, pp. 256-257).  These issues 
and others remain present in today’s MWD programs. 
Another Master’s thesis was written on the subject of military working dogs by 
Lieutenant Commander Mary Murry.  Her thesis was entitled, The Contributions of the 
American Military Working Dog in Vietnam dated June 5, 1998 was prepared for the US 
Army Command and General Staff College at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas.  The following 
abstract is from LCDR Murry’s thesis:  
3 
This study investigates the contributions of the Military Working Dogs in 
Vietnam to determine their significance to the United States’ war effort.  
There is limited written history concerning the use of the Military 
Working Dogs in Vietnam.  The methods and procedures employed in this 
study data relied extensively on personal military After Action Reports 
and histories (written and oral) to compile a historical account of the 
military working dog in Vietnam.  The study found that when correctly 
employed, these animals made significant contribution to the United 
States’ war effort in terms of the saving of lives and in the protection of 
military resources.  However, these contributions could not be quantified 
therefore assumptions were made as to the effectiveness of the animals.  
Despite their effectiveness, the scout, tracker, and mine/tunnel dog 
programs were disbanded at the conclusion of the Vietnam War.  This 
practice of disbanding military working dog programs at the conclusion of 
conflict is one that has been practiced since World War II.  Each 
subsequent war has necessitated the rebuilding of military working dog 
programs.  Today, only the sentry dogs are still active, having been joined 
by the relatively new narcotic detection dogs.  Future conflicts may 
necessitate rebuilding the scout, tracker, and mine/tunnel dog programs. 
I have found that all of the points that LCDR Murry made in her thesis remain 
valid today.  The ongoing conflicts in Southwest ASIA have renewed some interest in 
recreating programs similar to those developed in the past.  And, indeed, variations on 
past programs are in development or becoming operational once again.  
Fortunately, several books have been published since Frost wrote his thesis, 
including Lemish’s, War Dogs that depict the history of the military working dogs.  
These historical accounts led me down a number of avenues where, like Frost, I 
discovered during my research that: 
A large gap exists between what is known in the research world (science) 
and what is applied in the ‘real world’ (art). In other words, no evidence 
could be found that the art of producing consistent, top quality working 
dogs was based on scientific principles that ensure repetitive and verifiable 
results. (Frost, p. 2) 
This use of the term “art” led me to create a questionnaire by which to elicit and 
draw on the expertise of former and current military handlers and dog trainers.  I had 
limited success finding sources of scientific or detailed information about the 




had first-hand experience themselves.  I found through my investigation of the MWD 
program that certain trends have persisted over time, while other lessons have been lost 
and are worth recovering.   
During my research on the MWD’s, I visited the current MWD program, the DoD 
Military Working Dog Training Center at Lackland AFB.  I also had the opportunity to 
personally visit with Jesse Mendez, former Vietnam scout dog handler and trainer, and 
correspond with several former and current handlers by telephone and email.  From the 
conversations and emails with former handlers and current handlers and the use of 
written materials, I developed a questionnaire covering topics about which I felt former 
and current handlers could provide some insights.  I conducted an extensive literature 
review of every available US military manual printed on the subject of dogs and every 
civilian book that could be found.  This was an attempt to determine the context and 
history of the current program in an effort to discover how the program evolved to its 
current state and so that I could collate lessons along the way.  This literature review 
revealed an extensive and colorful history.  Military Working Dogs (MWDs) have 
successfully saved lives during past conflicts, the implication being that they could also 
do so in today’s conflicts.  
This thesis is divided into five chapters.  Chapter I is an introductory chapter.  In 
Chapter II, I briefly cover the history of war dogs through the US experience in Korea.  
Chapter III describes US programs since Korea, with a particular focus on the scout dog 
program in Vietnam.  Chapter IV outlines the current MWD program.  In Chapter V, I 
summarize responses to my questionnaire and make a series of recommendations. 
E. ASSUMPTIONS 
This study assumes that: 
1.  The information and expertise required to address the problem exists, but is not 
static. 
2.  That the amount of information collected by a variety of methods—literature 
review, interviews, questionnaires, email, and phone conversations—is sufficient to yield 
valid conclusions. 
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3.  As Frost himself noted, “Expert consensus will yield valid conclusion, even 
though it is difficult to prove, on a scientific basis, whether an SME [subject matter 
expert] is right or wrong.  If a group of SMEs reaches a consensus on a specific subject, 
the chance that all will be wrong will be minimal” (Frost, p. 3). 
F. LIMITATIONS 
1.  Pertinent data may not be available, or may be incomplete, due to specific 
policies of general nondisclosure or for proprietary reasons. 
2.  Contacting all potential sources of information was not possible, primarily due 
to time constraints. 
3.  The amount of time that I could spend as an observer at the DoD MWD 
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II. HISTORY OF THE MILITARY WORKING DOG 
A. INTRODUCTION TO THE HISTORY OF MILITARY DOGS 
Over thirty thousand dogs have served in the U.S. military, thrust into 
harm’s way and responsible for saving thousands of American lives.  
Throughout history, dogs have been employed effectively for sentry and 
scouting duty, finding booby traps, and locating wounded and lost 
soldiers.  Their only reward was merely praise for doing a good job.  
Having fought alongside humankind in battle, these dogs are the forgotten 
veterans. (Lemish, 1996, p. ix)1 
Militaries have employed dogs in a variety of roles throughout history.  Dogs 
have been used primarily as defensive weapons; however, attempts have also been made 
to use them offensively.  The use of dogs has changed and has been tailored to each 
conflict.  As Lemish states, “High-tech wizardry may have changed the look of today’s 
battlefront, but one thing will never change—the need for early detection of the enemy.  
For thousands of years dogs have been in front of men engaged in battle.  Military 
traditions dictates and demands that they will always be ‘Forever Forward’” (p. xiv).   
B. PRIOR TO WORLD WAR I  
“The earliest known battle dog was a mastiff type from Tibet that was 
domesticated during the Stone Age.  Persians, Greeks, Assyrians, and Babylonians all 
recognized the tactical advantage of war dogs and deployed them in great numbers as 
forward attacking elements” (Lemish, 1996, p. 1).  The Assyrians used dogs as early as 
2300 B.C. (Thornton, 1990, p. 4).  There are records describing one engagement where 
dogs were used in the Peloponnesian War (431-404 B.C.).  “During the battle of Versella, 
women led hordes of war dogs against the Romans” (Lemish, 1996, p. 2).  “In the fifth 
century, Attila the Hun understood the advantage of traveling with dogs and journeyed 
with four-legged sentinels in his conquest of Europe.  As with knights and horses during 
the Middle Ages, canine armor developed, encasing the dogs in battle plates and chains 
(Lemish, 1996, p. 3).  The Italian naturalist Aldrovandus, born 1522, wrote of the 
                                                 
1 Michael Lemish has been the historian for the Vietnam Dog Handler’s Association. He is not a 
Vietnam veteran or a former dog handler.  Lemish’s book, War Dogs: Canines in Combat is widely 
regarded as the most accurate and comprehensive book on the subject of war dogs.  Given the fact that little 
has been written about the war dogs of the United States, I have frequently referenced and quoted from 
Lemish’s book.  I have done this primarily because of his ability to concisely represent the complicated and 
ambiguous circumstances that reflect the history of the use of dogs by the military.  Lemish’s book 
currently offers the best single resource for understanding the subject.   
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development of sentry and war dogs.  His writings were very similar to those of the 
United States’ Air Force manuals written more than 400 years later (p. 3). 
In 1695, the British obtained one hundred savage dogs in Havana, Cuba, 
and transported them to Jamaica.  Here they participated in the Maroon 
War, a guerilla action fought by renegade African slaves.  During the 
Spanish Morocco War dogs surfaced as tactical decoys. (p. 3) 
Napoleon Banaparte, in 1798, used dogs chained to the wall of Alexandria, Egypt 
for early warning.  He understood that the dogs also served as a delaying mechanism if 
enemy soldiers attacked, since they would have to deal with the dogs on any approach to 
the city.   
With the development of gunpowder, dogs’ roles changed from being active 
combatants to providing auxiliary support for soldiers in the field (p. 4).  Yet, at about the 
same time warfare was becoming mechanized, militaries increasingly became aware of 
the intelligence of dogs.  Europeans showed the most and earliest interest in expanding 
the use of canines.  The same level of interest was not shown at the time in the United 
States. 
America’s first war dogs were used by Native Americans to aid in transporting 
people who were sick or injured.  The Native Americans used dogs defensively, not 
offensively.  Early colonists used dogs mostly for hunting, herding, and protection.  A 
law enacted in 1706 declared that people living in the frontier areas should whelp dogs 
that could be used to aid in the fight against the Indians.  Benjamin Franklin first 
suggested the use of scout and attack dogs in 1755.  No one acted on Franklin’s 
suggestions.  “John Penn, the grandson of William Penn, who founded Pennsylvania, and 
lieutenant governor of the colony from 1763 to 1771, also suggested employing war 
dogs” (p. 6).  
Dogs were used on a limited basis during the Civil War.  “Officially at least, there 
existed no organized military dog program for either side of the war….By the late 1800s 
the military still had not adopted any official war dog program, but the Civil War did 
plant firm roots for the use of mascots and pets” (p. 8).  Confederate and Union soldiers 
alike adopted dogs they found wandering the countryside and made them mascots or pets.  
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“Fan, the pet of Captain J.W. Byron of the 88th New York, repeatedly demonstrated her 
bravery under fire, according to an eyewitness who wrote: 
Fan went into every battle, and while the firing was brisk lay down behind 
a big log or in some other secure place.  And when a lull would follow 
she’d sally out and run along the regiment to see if any of her friends were 
killed or injured.  She was very much attached to [one] man of the 
company, who during the firing fell mortally wounded.  When Fan came 
up to him she threw herself on him and cried.  She wept and licked him, 
while the poor fellow would throw out his hand to pat her as he feebly 
exclaimed, “Poor Fan! Poor Fan!” (Thurston, 1996, p. 175) 
The 11th Regiment of Pennsylvania Volunteers had a mascot similarly devoted to 
the unit, so much so that she led the unit before President Abraham Lincoln in a pass in 
review after the Battle of Gettysburg.  “As a permanent dedication to her memory, a cast 
bronze replica of Sallie stands at the base of the granite monument to the Eleventh 
Pennsylvania Infantry on the battlefield at Gettysburg National Military Park.  It is 
located near the unit’s actual battle positions on Oak Ridge, northwest of the historic 
town of Gettysburg” (Libby, 1962, intro.). 
It wasn’t really until the Spanish-American War of 1898, that dogs came to be 
used as a force multiplier.  The Americans easily had the firepower advantage over the 
Spanish on sea and land.  “Problems arose when the [American] army began to launch 
patrols on horseback in hostile territory covered with thick vegetation and narrow paths.  
Small groups of guerillas set up ambushes and fired from concealed locations upon the 
patrols before disengaging and melting back into the landscape” (Lemish, 1996, p. 9).   
As Edwin Richardson describes in his 1910 book, War, Police, and Watch Dogs: 
An American officer, Captain M.F. Steele, of the 6th Cavalry, after varied 
experience of the conditions of warfare in the Philippines, strongly urges 
that dogs should be attached to the army.  He [Captain Steele] says that 
“dogs are the only scouts that can secure a small detachment against 
ambush on the trails through these tropical jungles.  The bush is so dense 
that flankers are out of the question, and the trails are so crooked, and over 
such rough territory, that the leading man at one or two hundred yards is 
out of sight of the main party.  The insurgents, lying in ambush, usually or 
often let the leading man pass, and open with a volley upon the wagons 
and main party of the escort.  They open from apparently impenetrable 
jungle, and at a range of from 30 to 200 yards.  They fire one or two 
volleys, then usually run away.  Sometimes never a man of them can be 
seen, and our men have simply to fire into the jungle and trust luck.  The 
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orders at present from the Jifles’ superiors are, that the insurrectors shall 
not attack in parties less than fifty, that they shall attack none but very 
small parties of Americans, and that they shall always make use of 
ambuscades.”  He urges that “the animals—pointers by preference, or 
hounds—would need little training.  Their instinct for hunting and sniffing 
in every hole and corner would be sufficient to justify their use.” 
(Richardson, 1910, pp. 102-103)   
It was said of Captain Steele’s dog, Don, that, “Not once was the patrol ambushed 
with Don on the point” (Lemish, 1996, p. 9).  But the U.S. army did not pursue the 
possibility of using dogs, despite Captain Steele’s successful experience. 
“Ironically, Col. E. H. Richardson, in a successful effort to establish a military 
dog program in Great Britain, recounted the efforts of Captain Steele and Don in a 
magazine article in 1911.  The British would then go on to amass thousands of dogs for 
use in World War I” (p. 9). 
C. WORLD WAR I 
During World War I, dogs were employed in three primary roles: ambulance 
services, messenger service, and sentry detail. Some secondary roles included 
ammunition and light-gun carriers and scouts, and Jack Russell terriers were used to 
combat the rats in the trenches.   
The conditions on the battlefield of World War I created a unique environment 
with significant areas of “no-man’s land” created between trenches of the opposing sides.  
Since the area between the trenches was so dangerous, dogs worked these areas with 
success.  The Red Cross dogs or sanitary dogs, for instance, would provide the wounded 
with medical supplies and water, as well as companionship.  If a wounded soldier was 
found, the dogs would act as a guide to bring rescuers to the wounded soldier or guide the 
soldier back to a field hospital.  “In one case a French Red Cross dog named Captain 
located thirty wounded men in a single day using this method” (Lemish, 1996, p. 13).  
Another French dog named Prusco located more than 100 wounded men after a single 
battle.  Reportedly, Prusco dragged wounded soldiers to the protection of crates and 
trenches during his search, before alerting rescuers of the wounded men’s location.  
Each side trained dogs to indicate the location of the wounded; however, the 
signal used by each country was different.  It was also reported that the dogs could 
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differentiate between friends and enemies, though there is no proof of this fact. The dogs 
worked at night and relied on their olfactory ability (Richardson, 1910, p. 76).  
The French began using military dogs in 1906, but stopped in 1914 after the 
Battle of the Marne. The decision was made by Marshal Joseph Joffre, for reasons that 
remain unclear (Lemish, 1996, p. 14).  Some thought he just hated dogs, while others 
think that the nature of the fighting at that time made their use ineffectual.  The French 
reactivated their program in 1915, calling it the Service des Chiens de Guerre.  The 
program expanded through the end of the war. 
Many breeds of dogs saw duty during the First World War.  “Bulldogs, retrievers, 
Airedale terriers, sheepdogs, and German shepherds were used in a variety of roles.  
Purebreeds did not have any advantage over mixed breeds, and this is probably true 
today” (Lemish, p. 15).  Among other things, dogs were used as draft animals.  The dogs 
presented a smaller target than horses, could operate without a soldier present, and did 
not consume as much food.  Unlike mechanized transportation, the dogs could likewise 
operate over rough terrain, did not need gasoline, and did not suffer from mechanical 
failure. 
Except for the United States, every country embroiled in the war 
considered dogs a valuable commodity.  When the United States entered 
the war, few American commanders grasped the advantages of developing 
the animal to their full potential and needed to borrow them from the 
French or British. (p. 17)    
The messenger dogs achieved a long list of successes in World War I.  Each side 
used dogs to relay messages from unit to unit.  There are many stories of dogs 
successfully relaying messages even under intense fire and after being seriously 
wounded.  In Colonel Richardson’s later writings, he extols the virtues of messenger dogs 
and comments that they could be trained in just six weeks.  These later writings are a 
contrast to those from his earlier 1910 book, when he writes, “…; but my experience 
tends to show that too much is expected of the dog, and although dogs are found to be 
sufficiently intelligent to discriminate direction under difficult circumstances, still the 
result is too uncertain, and the teaching partakes too much of the trick-training to be of 
practical use” (Richardson, 1910, p. 90).  “Richardson always believed the prime  
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motivation for a dog should be positive praise and reinforcement. This would be a key 
element in developing any type of war dog, and one factor not always adhered to” 
(Lemish, 1996, p. 21). 
On April 6, 1917, President Wilson declared war against Germany to keep the 
world “safe for democracy.”  On June 16, 1917 American joined the French and 180,000 
U.S. troops were added to the war.  “Of all the armies participating in the Great War, 
only the United States lacked war dogs within its military ranks, with the exception of 
some sled dogs in Alaska” (p. 21).  According to Lemish, several American canine 
associations tried to persuade the military to adopt a war dog program, but with no 
success.  This may be due to the belief that the war would end quickly with America’s 
entry.   
According to Lemish: 
During the spring of 1918, the General Headquarters of the American 
Expeditionary Forces recommended the use of dogs as messengers, 
sentries, draft animal, and patrol auxiliaries.  The proposal suggested that 
500 dogs be obtained from the French military every three months.  After 
training, each American division would be supplied with 288 dogs.  The 
program also specified the establishment of training facilities to be built 
within the United States and the construction of five kennels that could 
house 200 dogs each.  It promised to give the American army its first 
official canine unit.  The hierarchy of the military, after reviewing the 
recommendations, dropped the plan entirely for unknown reasons.  Many 
years passed before a similar proposal was finally adopted. (p. 23) 
Some dogs were sent overseas, but to be trained by civilians.  This civilian 
training meant that the dogs were not exposed to various weapons firing or the impact of 
rounds in close proximity.  Again, Lemish points out, “The deficiency in their training 
regimen made the animals useless at the front, as they understandably cowered under fire.  
The same problems would plague many war dogs fielded by the United States in the 
years to come” (p. 24). 
Contrary to Army regulations, mascots were adopted by Americans in France 
during World War I.  Though the dogs were not formally trained, the dogs did play key 
roles.  “Rin Tin Tin, for example, was a German mascot puppy found alone in a trench 
after an attack by Americans.  The dog would grow up to be a matinee idol and added to 
the folklore and popularity of the German shepherd breed” (p. 25). 
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Stubby was another famous example of a dog that discovered a sense of duty as a 
mascot.  A number of different books devote several chapters to Stubby’s life story.  
Stubby joined the 102d Infantry which was part of the Army’s 26th “Yankee” Division 
during the summer of 1917.  The dog was smuggled onto the ship transporting the unit to 
St. Nazaire, France in January 1918.  One night, Stubby warned a sleeping soldier of an 
impending gas attack.  On another occasion, Stubby the dog attacked a German who had 
infiltrated into the unit’s area.  The unit’s soldiers fashioned a Victory Medal with five 
bars to show the dog’s participation in each of the unit’s offensives.  He became known 
as the “Hero Dog”.  Stubby received numerous awards and medals and was made a life 
member of many organizations, including the American Red Cross, the YMCA, and the 
American Legion.  Stubby also met three U.S. Presidents.  In 1926, when he finally died 
of old age, Irene Gevenwilson Kilner, curator of the Red Cross Museum, asked to prepare 
Stubby for permanent display.  He remained at the museum for 30 years before being 
moved to the Smithsonian Institute (p. 27). 
By way of comparison, the Germans sent 6,000 dogs to the front upon the start of 
the WWI with 4,000 in reserve with their civilian owners. Italy fielded 3,000 dogs for the 
Allies and the French fielded even more.  The British started the war with one dog, but 
due to the efforts of Colonel Richardson, who later started the British War Dog School 
(Lemish, 1996, p. 28), the British soon developed a dog program that apparently provided 
thousands of dogs for the British war effort and also for the efforts of the Americans later 
in the war.2   
Once the war was over, “The French military, then [at the cessation of hostilities] 
possessing fifteen thousand dogs in its employ, destroyed the animals as its great war 
machine demobilized.  The vast quantities of dogs used by the British, Germans, Italians, 
and Russians faced the same fate” (p. 29).  Significantly, the Germans did not destroy 
their animals and maintained their program after the war.   
In contrast, the US appears to have learned very little.  The U.S. military budget 
declined sharply after World War I and no interest was shown by the military in the 
pursuit of a military dog program.  There were individual advocates but no serious efforts 
were made through the 1920s or 1930s. 
                                                 
2 I could not find an estimated number of dogs fielded by the British. 
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D. WORLD WAR II 
With the emergence of Adolf Hitler as the leader of Germany and his invasions of 
countries in Europe, it appeared by 1938 that the world would again be engulfed by war. 
Several years before the beginning of World War II, the German military 
authorities, again foreseeing an approaching conflict, began a canine force 
to be used in the front lines of warfare.  As a result of this planning, the 
Nazis had, in 1939, what was probably the largest, best trained, and best-
equipped canine army in the world.  It was estimated that they had 50,000 
Pinschers, Sheepdogs, Alsatians (German Shepherd dogs), and Rottweilers 
trained for active service as pack-carriers, first-aid scouts, and messengers, 
while others of the same breeds were well trained for carrying out 
reconnaissance with patrols.  When the shooting began, these specially 
trained dogs quickly found the positions of the Allied forces and, thus, 
frequently made it possible for the Nazis to annihilate these positions.  The 
majority of these dogs were trained at the Military Kennels at Frankfurt, 
established in 1934, where some 2,000 animals were constantly being 
trained (Sloane, 1955, pp. 386-387).   
The U.S. was also aware that the Germans supplied hundreds of dogs to the 
Japanese military authorities.  According to Downey, the Germans supplied Japan with, 
“25,000 trained war dogs before Pearl Harbor” (Downey, 1955, p. 5). 
However, some Americans were clearly paying attention.  For example, an article 
in the January 1940 issue of Infantry Journal described the war dog’s potential in battle 
and used information and photographs from the German and Japanese armies (Lemish, 
1996, p. 31).  Just as Captain Steele argued several decades previously: 
In Panama and the Philippine Islands on jungle trails, where flank security 
is impossible of achievement because of the dense growth, dogs used as 
advance guards and scouts could ferret out an ambush before it could take 
effect.  Their ability to work in tangled terrain would be an invaluable 
security measure in jungle operations. 
Considering the many ways in which the dogs may benefit the soldier we 
should begin now to breed and train suitable types of dogs for the various 
functions of probable employment, to develop the dog’s most favorable 
characteristics, and to expand the number of uses wherever such 
employment will relieve a man.  This program cannot be fully realized 
after M day [the first day of a war]; it should start at once.  Our liaison 
with dogdom should be much closer than that implied by the common 
name for the soldier’s identification tag (p. 31) 
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In 1941, the military did obtain 50 sled dogs from the Byrd Antarctic Expedition.  
The dogs were sent to Greenland to help locate and rescue crashed pilots.  No official dog 
program existed yet.  The catalyst to start a program came from a fear.  The foundation of 
this fear, “consisted of saboteurs, fifth columnists, and enemy aliens, within the 
continental United States, who could potentially damage the rapidly expanding industrial 
plants with strategically placed explosives or incendiary devices,” and this fear, “became 
an even greater reality as Japanese submarines operated off the Pacific coast and German 
U-boats increased their activities along the Atlantic seaboard” (Lemish, 1996, p. 34).  
Various dog associations around the country pushed the use of sentry dogs.  One widely 
circulated selling point was that, “A single dog could replace eight sentries, freeing them 
for more important work” (p. 34).  Yet, on the day after Pearl Harbor, the entire U.S. 
Army library contained just one book about dogs: a field manual on the care and 
transportation of dogs in Arctic regions (p. 35). 3   
In March of 1942, several months after Pearl Harbor, the War Department 
appointed a civilian organization, “Dogs for Defense,” as the official procurement agency 
for U.S. war dogs: 
Without cost to the Government, that organization recruited, at first 
trained, and shipped to military centers the dogs which formed the K-9 
Corps.  Dogs for Defense, Inc. staged highly successful publicity and 
financial campaigns which made its accomplishments possible.  Carrying 
on throughout the war, it continued to supply thousands of dogs to the 
Armed Forces, launched a war dog breeding program and acted as the 
Government’s agent for the demobilization of the K-9’s.  Without Dogs 
for Defense, Inc., there would in all likelihood have been no K-9 Corps 
(Downey, 1955, p. 7). 
The war dog reception (K-9) centers fell under the jurisdiction of the Office of the 
Quartermaster General.  The K-9 centers trained dogs in one or another of the following 
duties: interior guard duty, which included sentry and attack; and the tactical service, 
which included messenger, scout, and casualty duties.  Early in the efforts, the DFD 
concentrated on defensive roles for dogs, not offensive or tactical roles.  The Coast Guard  
 
 
                                                 
3 This fact was verified by simply conducting a search of past US Army manuals, the earliest was the 
FM 25-6 – Dog Team Transportation. 
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began its program in July of 1942 for sentry and beach patrol.  This program was started 
to aid in the policing of the thousands of miles of coastline, military installations, and 
“war plants” in the United States. 
Although, the Coast Guard and the DFD programs experienced disappointing 
early results with training the sentry dogs, the program continued to expand.  Soon 
tactical roles for the dogs were envisioned and a directive was issued to all the service 
branches “to explore the possibilities of using dogs advantageously in the various 
activities under their control” (p. 40).   
On March 13, 1942, the Army transferred it authorization for 200 trained sentry 
dogs to the Dogs for Defense.  “It [March 13, 1942] marks the first time in the history of 
the United States that war dogs were officially recognized” (p. 21).   
Problems that developed in the DFD program continue to plague current dog 
programs.  For instance, the dog trainers who volunteered to help in the effort were 
amateurs as well as professionals.  The dog training was initially scattered among several 
kennels throughout the country because no single kennel was capable of accommodating 
large numbers of dogs at one time.  “Soon it became apparent that this widely scattered 
and loose-knit system was neither altogether efficient nor economical. While training 
specifications for sentry dogs had been set up by DFD, a more standardized procedure 
would be required, particularly if training were diversified to include other types of war 
dogs” (p. 21).  Another problem that faced the DFD program was the lack of personnel, 
since expert trainers were too few and scattered across the country. 
By December 30, 1942, the Quartermaster General notified the members of DFD 
that the U.S. Armed Forces would require 125,000 dogs for the war, though by war’s end, 
the actual number of dogs enlisted into service ranged between 17,000 and 25,000 for the 
U.S. (p. 22).  
Given these numbers, the military classed 32 breeds and crosses as war dogs in its 
Technical Manual 10-396 (1 July 1943).  The list then was pared down due to scarcity of 
certain breeds, experiences during training, and various experiments.  The military and 
DFD tried to standardize procedures for training and procurement, but the changing 
requirements and need for public participation complicated the efforts.  The curtailment 
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of certain breeds caused problems with some members of the public who were eager to 
enlist their animals to support the war effort.  Many misunderstood the reasons that the 
military declined their animals for service.  The DFD procurement problems were 
compounded, meanwhile, by sudden initiatives by the military.  One such initiative was 
that of the M-dogs.  This program called for smaller dogs such as Cocker and Springer 
Spaniels and Dachshunds to counter the threat of non-metallic mines that were being 
introduced by Germany in North Africa (Downey, 1955. pp. 25-33).   
According to Downey, in the History of Dogs for Defense:  
The new mine was slowing the Allied advance….Alert keen-nosed 
animals were taught to point an anti-tank or anti-personnel mine by sitting 
down from one to four paces in front of it.  In training, they were given an 
electric shock when they walked into a trap, demonstrating to them that 
there were objects in the ground that would hurt them and that they must 
shun them. 
The idea of M-dogs was ingeniously derived from the observation that 
squirrels can find a nut they buried month earlier, or dogs a long-cached 
bone.  Similarly, dogs tested at the camps were able to indicate where 
mines or other objects had been buried.  At camp and in rear areas, the M-
dogs performed excellently.  Both the British and Americans trained and 
sent out units of M-dogs.  The British Royal Engineers, trying the dogs at 
the front, found that they located at best only 51% of the mines planted 
and suffered many casualties.  The dogs proved to be too seriously 
distracted by the dead and debris of a battlefield to function well.  The 
American unit, sent to Italy, accomplished nothing whatever and was 
reported for the poor discipline and low morale of its personnel.  Its failure 
was not the dogs’ fault (Downey, pp. 32-33).    
The M-dogs worked on a six-foot leash and were also trained to indicate mine-
free areas.  The Army deactivated the units since a detection rate of less than 90 percent 
was unacceptable.  The Russians reportedly had an M-dog that found 2,000 mines in 
eighteen days.  The dog was used to de-mine hundreds of railroad tracks and several key 
airports.   
The Russians also trained dogs to conduct anti-tank missions by carrying bombs 
under attacking tanks.  The idea was that once the anti-tank bomb was under the tank, it 
and the dog would be exploded, theoretically destroying the enemy tank.  The problem 
developed when the dogs began destroying Russian tanks instead of the German tanks.  It 
was then discovered that the training methods used were the cause of the problem: though 
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the dogs were conditioned by having them to search for food under Russian tanks, the 
Russian tanks ran of a different fuel than the German tanks.  The dogs were able to 
differentiate between Russian and German tanks due to the type of fuel and so they ran 
under the Russian tanks on the battlefield.   
A similar US program was proposed to destroy bunkers along beaches.  The dogs 
would be equipped with explosives and then trained to run into enemy bunkers, where the 
explosives would be detonated.  This plan was rejected due to the difficulty of training 
the dogs to differentiate between bunkers with friendly and enemy personnel.  
Interestingly, current reports indicate that the Israelis have programs that use dogs as 
“smart” bombs.  
Another ill-conceived dog program involved training packs of dogs to attack and 
“kill”.  Walter B. Pandre, a civilian, claimed he could accomplish this for between 20-
30,000 dogs.  Due to problems and delays, the military officer assigned to oversee Pandre 
called for an army dog trainer to help with the program.  The Army trainer accomplished 
in weeks the basic obedience that Pandre had been unable to accomplish in months, 
though the idea of assault dogs working in packs itself turned out to be “not practical.”  
The program failed to produce the effects desired and the dogs did not demonstrate the 
“ferocity or intent…to do any bodily harm” (p. 57).  The dogs, even after training would 
not attack without direct supervision and reinforcement of a handler.  They also became 
easily distracted by environmental variables, such as small animals.  Later 
demonstrations continued to fail to meet expectations, and as the military officer 
overseeing the experiments remarked,  
In my opinion it [the demonstration] would be convincing to a person 
without knowledge of both tactics and dogs.  To me the performances of 
the animals with one exception appeared artificial and forced and with one 
exception I do not believe I saw anything that could be developed in 
something of military value (p. 57).  
The DFD launched the DFD Breeding program in the summer of 1943.  The 
program emphasized the importance of carefully breeding selected top dogs that 
possessed traits desired in their offspring.  The program required volunteers to assume the 
expense of raising the puppies until they were one year old.  At one year, the DFD 
inspectors would classify the dogs into one of three categories: (1) Accepted for the 
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Armed Forces; (2) Suitable for the Seeing Eye program; (3) Offered as a gift to the 
breeder (p. 33).  The drop in demand ended the breeding program on December 15, 1943. 
By the end of 1944, the number of Armed Forces’ preferred breeds was down to 
five: German and Belgian Shepherds, Dobermans, Collies, and Giant Schnauzers, plus 
crosses of those breeds (Downey, p. 34).  Most of the dogs were doing scout duty by this 
time.  “In 1946, the German Shepherd was named by the War Department as the official 
U.S. Army dog” (p.34). 
The Marines were the first of the services to show interest in dogs and to 
incorporate their use in their manuals. The use of dogs in jungle warfare had been 
suggested in the 1935 revision of the Small Wars Operations, authored by COL Victor 
Bleasdale, published by the Marine Corps Schools.  In Chapter 24 of the manual COL 
Bleasdale wrote, “Dogs on Reconnaissance: Dogs have been employed to indicate the 
presence of a hidden enemy, particularly ambushes” (p. 59). 
The Marines started developing their dog program in December 1942.  Their 
initial efforts were disappointing mostly due to problems with the trainers, but with 
continuing efforts most of these early problems were eliminated.  One problem was the 
initial trainers had trained dogs in civilian life and did not appreciate the unique 
challenges experienced during combat.  It was determined that a Marine dog handler 
should be someone, “…who could scout and patrol on his own and simply used the dog 
as an extension of his own talents” (p. 62). The Marines focused their training on scout 
and messenger dogs, noting that since, “the Marine Corps is strictly a combat 
organization, it was felt that time should not be wasted on training dogs unless that 
training contributed to directly killing the enemy or to reducing Marines casualties” (p. 
61).   
The Marine war dog training camp was located at New River, presumably North 
Carolina, and commanded by Captain Jackson Boyd.  From his experience with trainers 
and handlers Boyd observed that: 
Men who have associated with animals have that indefinable ability to 
read their minds and understand them are the most successful. A high 




dogs and farm stock….In general it may be said that through all his 
training, the man gives orders to his dog; once trained, the dog gives 
orders to the man. 
The dogs are not to be considered as a new weapon; they have not 
replaced anyone or anything.  They have simply added to security by their 
keen perception, and their use should be limited to situations where that 
increased perception is of service.  Where a man can function 
satisfactorily by his own intelligence and perception, the dog is 
superfluous. 
On the other hand, it has been found that the dog’s care and feeding 
present a very minor problem and add little to the burden which already 
exists for an outfit in the field.  The dog can thrive on the biscuits and 
canned meat in the field ration.  He needs no shelter beyond that provided 
for a man, and a dog can safely drink any water not deliberately poisoned.  
His medical care parallels a man’s (Downey, pp. 54-55). 
All dog teams had to complete basic training which included basic obedience 
training.  Once the basic training was completed, the dogs were selected for specialized 
training.  “Higher rating in intelligence, willingness, energy, and sensitivity were required 
for scout and messenger (13-week course) than for sentry dogs (8-week course)” 
(Downey, 1955, p. 56). 
No dogs were trained just for attack.  Dogs were taught to mistrust anyone but 
their master and the natural tendency to attack by certain dogs was not discouraged.  
Several dogs saved their handlers in combat by tackling the enemy.  “But attack dogs as 
such were not desired by combat troops—they were too vulnerable.  Sending them to 
charge the enemy was, in the opinion of a Marine captain ‘just a waste of a good dog’” 
(p. 56). 
Silence was clearly impressed on scout dogs.  Sternly scolded if they 
barked, they learned on scenting an enemy to alert their handlers 
unmistakably but quietly.  Some stood tense, others crouched suddenly.  
Some pointed like bird dogs.  With some their hackles rose or a low growl 
rumbled in their throats.  They worked both on and off leash, but the 
former was preferred because it gave closer control (Downey, p. 56). 
The training of the handlers became as important as that of the dogs.  Again, 
Downey describes the situation facing the services—both then and now: 
That man failure meant dog failure was axiomatic but not generally 
appreciated at first.  Unless handlers were capable and willing and 
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physically able to stand tough campaigning, it was no use sending a scout 
dog platoon to the front.  The Marines understood that sooner than the 
Army which accounted for the former’s greater success in the earlier 
Pacific operations.  To quote Captain Boyd again: “Something was wanted 
which would help in direct contact with the enemy.  It soon became 
apparent that if the war dog was the answer, the important thing lay in the 
selection of the type of man to handle him—the type of man who, dog or 
no dog, makes an excellent Marine, capable of scouting and patrolling on 
his own, the dog merely an animated instrument to increase his radius of 
perception (p. 57). 
In sum, the Marines trained their own war dogs and organized them and the 
personnel handling the dogs into platoons, regularly attached to battalions or regiments in 
combat. 
The Army got off to a much bumpier start.  One initial difficulty had to do with 
the assignment of Quartermaster Corps personnel to the K-9 Corps.   
Quartermaster personnel consequently manned the scout dog platoon.  
Their QM insignia prejudiced field commander who did not believe 
service force men were likely to be trained for jungle patrols.  That 
estimate was correct in some cases.  Ultimately the Army saw the light 
and infantrymen trained as scouts were assigned as handlers, with the 
outfits redesignated from Quartermaster to Infantry Scout Dog Platoons 
(p. 57). 
By V-J Day, September 2, 1945, six new Scout Dog Platoons had been organized, 
trained, and were about to graduate. 
As described by Downey, 
At the camps scout dog platoons were regularly organized and equipped 
before proceeding to the front as a unit.  A First Lieutenant commanded 
and the remainder of the personnel was non-commissioned: One Technical 
Sergeant, four Sergeants, and fifteen Technicians, Grade 5, who were the 
dog handlers.  The Table of Organization called for 27 scout dogs.  
Armament was the carbine and pistol or revolver. Six jeeps with trailers 
were authorized.  Gas masks for men and dogs and all the regular dog 
equipment—leashes, brushes, veterinary supplies, and so on, were 
furnished (p. 58). 
The dogs were not effective on the initial amphibious assaults.  The dogs could 
handle being under fire, but their senses were of little use in such an extreme, dynamic 
environment.  The dogs worked best at night to warn of Japanese counter-attacks and 
once the beachhead had been secured, the dogs’ abilities were readily demonstrated (p. 
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80).  The deciding factor on effectiveness seemed to have been the training that the dog 
team received.  The experiments performed showed that dogs needed to be trained to 
tolerate artillery fire.  Most had been trained around small arms fire, but not under 
artillery-type explosions.  These training factors were identified by handlers in the field 
and the information was relayed back to the training programs so they could adjust 
accordingly.  
The K-9 Corps contributed significantly to the war effort in the Pacific Islands 
during World War II.  As a regimental commander on a Pacific Island reflects about the 
contributions made by the K-9 Corps: 
‘The dogs have made over 100 patrols to date with Infantry troops, 
ranging from five-man reconnaissance patrols to combat patrols of a 
reinforced rifle company.  Length of patrol extended from one to five 
days…It is significant that during this period not a unit suffered a casualty 
from enemy ambushes or snipers when a scout dog was being used on the 
point of the patrol’ (Downey, 1955, p. 7). 
The Americans faced dense jungles where the trails were tunnels through 
vegetation.  If the soldiers did not use existing trails then they laboriously had to create 
new ones.  The risk of being ambushed in this environment was extremely high, 
especially since the Americans were attacking islands that had been occupied for a period 
of time by the Japanese.  The Japanese had the advantages of surprise, prior knowledge 
of the terrain, and prepared defensive positions.  The scout dogs took some of these 
advantages away from the Japanese: 
Yet when a scout dog and his handler were at the point of the patrol, then 
it was different.  A keen canine nose caught the Jap scent anywhere from a 
score to several hundred yards away.  The dog froze into rigidity, an 
almost inaudible rumble in his throat.  The patrol halted while scouts 
wriggled through the jungle to the flanks and dealt with the enemy 
machine gun covering the trail, or the patrol leader sent for a mortar 
section, perhaps by messenger dog, to blast out the ambush.  Sometimes a 
muzzle would point up a tree.  The Jap sniper, hidden in its branches, had 
made himself almost invisible to human eyes by painting his body 
green….The dog continued to point.  So Yank sub-machine guns sprayed 
the tree with lead, and the sniper’s body hurtled to the ground or hung 
limp from the belt that had bound him to the trunk. 
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Now and again the dogs failed.  But this sentence keeps recurring in 
reports on war dogs platoons by the division to which they were attached:  
“No Patrols led by dogs were fired on first or suffered casualties” (p. 81). 
According to Downey, the scout dogs’ successes in the Pacific Theater began to 
earn them a significant reputation, which then required the Staff to protect the platoons 
against over-estimates of their abilities (p. 91).  The reports state that dogs could detect 
enemy from 60 to 1000 yards depending on various environmental conditions and the 
dog team.  Earlier, most people believed that dogs could not be used in the Pacific theater 
because of disease and parasites in tropical climates.  Also the reports in 1942 of 
disappointments in North Africa added to doubts about their potential use.  Fortunately, 
these fears were proved wrong through the dogs’ actual performance in the Pacific.   
Orders were issued by the Staff of the Pacific Theater in a training circular sent to 
all divisions operating within the Pacific.  A précis of the guidance, as put together by 
Downey, is: 
No individual, it directed, will attempt to touch or feed a scout dog, nor 
will he speak, whistle, lunge at, or in any manner, either by voice or 
gesture, attempt to attract the dog’s attention. 
Dogs give silent warning in the following manner: by lunging on their 
leash, pointing in the manner of a bird dog, or by raising the hair on their 
back and neck.  They do not bark and seldom growl. 
The handler is the sole judge of what the dog can do.  He will not be 
ordered to work a dog if he says that the dog cannot work. 
One factor, such as the wrong direction of the wind, will cause a dog to be 
useless on a mission. 
Dogs work best for from 4 to 8 hours.  If a mission requires a night vigil 
all night, it must have two dogs. 
The use of scout dogs is a matter of common sense, mixed with a fair 
understanding of animals. 
These dogs are not super-weapons nor will they work miracles.  They 
have been trained for special work which they can do with the help and 
understanding of all concerned, and will more than prove their worth by 
giving timely warning of the approach of the enemy. (p. 92) 
One example of why the scout dog platoons began to develop such a favorable 
reputation was the performance of the 28th Infantry Scout Dog Platoon: not “one of the 
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more than 800 patrols led by its dogs was ambushed” (p. 99).  The 26th Scout Dog 
Platoon had a similar record, but according to Downey the 26th almost did not have the 
chance to enter battle due to prejudice against the use of the scout dog platoons.  Many 
people were prejudiced against the use of dogs, believing the dogs were not going to be 
effective and would cause an increased loss of US lives.  According to Downey, many 
thought that in, “…modern warfare they [dogs] were a hairbrained novelty, a probable 
nuisance, and a distinct liability.  Griping extended from operations staffs down through 
the rank and file.  Dogs were one of those wild ideas dreamed up by the chairborne 
brigades back in Washington and wished on troops on the line” (p. 99).   
Orders were given by higher commands for dogs to be used in combat operations.  
They may well have saved thousands of lives.  The problem is, it is a difficult to quantify 
the exact number of personnel that were saved in a manner likely to convince the critics 
and prove the scout dogs’ benefits to the infantry patrols.  Because of the orders to use 
the scout dogs, the 26th Scout Platoon demonstrated its valor and capabilities as shown by 
the awards and medals that it received. The 26th Scout Platoon’s personnel were, 
“…awarded one Silver Star, eight Bronze Stars, and seven Purple Hearts, two with Oak 
Lead clusters (the last-mentioned decorations was for wounds; none of the men were 
killed in action).  All members were given the prized Combat Infantryman Badge.  The 
platoon received a unit citation from the 31st Division and another from the 6th Division” 
(p. 107). 
During the 26th’s last few months of the Pacific campaign, there were reports that 
the Japanese made particular efforts to kill the scout dogs.  The Japanese were observed 
to pass up chances to shoot American soldiers, instead concentrating fire on the K-9s. 
Without question, the dogs proved invaluable aids in the “cave clean-ups” that 
followed major offensives on an island.  The caves had to be cleared to ensure that small 
groups of enemy were not behind American front lines where they could create trouble 
and kill US personnel.  Even though the dogs had not been specifically trained for this 
task, the adaptability of the dog teams proved they could execute this new role. 
As for Japanese war dog units, the Americans did encounter several of them.  One 
unit seemed to use small dogs that turned and ran back when they encountered American 
troops.  Several reports guessed that the Japanese would estimate the location of the U.S. 
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units from the length of time the dogs were scouting and the direction from which they 
returned.  The Americans, however, soon used these dogs to guide them to the Japanese 
positions. 
The Japanese scout dog programs seemed to have other problems, too.  Most of 
these appeared to stem from errors in tactics, training, and procedures, rather than from 
the capabilities of the dogs.  The Japanese scout dogs, “…worked off leash and about 
fifty yards ahead of the point, the dogs were sighted by American who thus learned the 
Japs were close at hand.  Even if a Jap dog was not seen, he lost the value of surprise for 
his masters, since unlike a well-trained K-9 he was apt to bark” (p. 97). 
At the close of the war, the US military had to decide what to do with the dogs 
that it had recruited.  The military attempted to return most of its K-9 veterans to a 
civilian role.  This decision was ambitious and not easy.  According to Downey, “four 
platoons were designated to be retrained in the postwar Army.  Their dogs include fine 
animals kept for breeding purposes” (p. 108).  The big challenge came in determining 
how to demobilize and disperse the remaining dogs.  The US military had control of 
approximately 8,000 dogs at the end of World War II (Downey, 1955, p. 108).  Many 
dogs were returned to the owners who had donated them for service.  Some donors, 
however, no longer wanted then due to a “change of circumstance” while the dog was at 
war.  Some dogs came from kennels and had no owners.   
According to Lemish: 
In April 1945, the War Department stated that the dogs would be disposed 
of through one of the following methods: 
1.  By issue to the Seeing Eye, Inc., as a prospective Seeing Eye dog. 
2.  By issue to a military organization as a mascot. 
3.  By making available to the servicemen dogs they had handled in the 
service. 
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4. By sale through negotiation of the Procurement Division, Treasury 
Department. (Lemish, 1996, p. 142).4 
E. POST-WORLD WAR II AND KOREA 
After World War II, the dog programs all but disappeared.  Recommendations 
were made by various individuals to continue working on the various dog programs that 
had been used during World War II, but they were seldom implemented.  When the 
Korean War began, the dog program in the military consisted of one active scout dog 
platoon (26th Infantry Platoon Scout Dog).5 
The Quartermaster Corps did maintain a procurement program through the Army 
Dog Association, which listed private breeders who had animals they would make readily 
available to the military when needed.  However, because of a lack of demand the 
Quartermaster Corps lost interest in the procurement of dogs and the program was quietly 
terminated in 1950 (Lemish, 1996, p. 150). 
Training also became an issue and no one wanted the responsibility, mostly 
because of lack of resources after the war.  On December 7, 1951, dog training was 
transferred to the Military Police Corps and the 26th Scout Dog Platoon moved to Fort 
Carson, Colorado.  Sentry Dogs became the focus since the country was at peace and 
scout dogs were “no longer required”.  The program was then transferred to the Chief of 
Army Field Forces in 1954.  The shifting of responsibilities resulted in a lot of confusion, 
                                                 
4 Before the dogs could be returned, they were “demilitarized”.  This “reprocessing” took almost as 
long as the original training.  The dog was re-trained to not be a “one-man” dog, and reoriented to the 
sights and sounds of American towns.  Dogs were trained and continually tested to ensure that any 
aggressive tendencies were eliminated to the extent possible.  Only a few dogs proved to be too aggressive 
to be returned.  Unfortunately, many dogs had diseases that could not be cured and were destroyed to 
prevent any spread of disease.  
The chance to provide a home to a surplus war dog was popular.  A total of over 15,000 adoption 
applications were received by the DFD.  The applications kept pouring in years after the last dog had found 
a new home.  The dogs were sent to their new homes accompanied by a collar, a leash, an honorable 
discharge certificate, and the Army manual War Dogs.  The manual was to serve as an instruction manual 
to help the new owners better understand the dogs.  Of all the dogs “demilitarized,” only four had to be 
returned to training camps due to behavioral problems. 
5 I could gather little information on the Korean War efforts.  The only source that I could find was a 
short chapter in Lemish’s book, War Dogs and a few articles from a few military journals.  I was fortunate 
to interview Captain Haggerty, a gentleman who has been running a prominent, civilian dog training 
business since his military service.  He did not serve as a dog handler in Korea; however, he did conduct a 
patrol with a dog team which led to his later reassignment to the Army Dog Training Center in 1956.  He 
was the Commanding Officer of two scout units, the 26th ISDP, at Fort Benning and at Fort Ord from 1959 
to 1961.  He later served as instructor of Sentry Dogs at Fort Gordon and as Liaison Officer between US 
Occupation Forces, Berlin Germany and the Berlin Police Department which had 120 dogs at the time. 
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yet this also did seem to matter since the military’s attention was on nuclear 
confrontation, not on conflicts that might require tactical uses of dogs. 
When the Korean War began, the only dogs available for service were those of 
the 26th Scout Dog Platoon.  In fact, “For its duration in Korea the platoon was never sent 
into reserve” (p. 155).  The platoon was also never supplied with all of its authorized 
equipment which added to the challenges facing the unit.   
According to emails I received from Theodore D. McKelvey, who was a member 
of a dog unit in Korea that, “was formed and trained ‘in Country’ within range of enemy 
artillery,” the unit was formed based on recommendations from T/Sgt Sheldon.  The 
commander had some understanding of the performance of dogs in World War II and was 
looking for similar capabilities for his unit in Korea.  The dog unit was not part of the 
official military war dog program, but a combat unit’s own dog program within the 1st 
Cavalry Division.  A brief history of this Tactical War Dog Platoon, 7th Regiment, 1st 
Cavalry Division can be found on the US War Dog Association Webpage.   
T/Sgt. Sheldon said he volunteered for duty in Korea to escape marital 
difficulties at home. After enduring the required refresher training, Sgt. 
Sheldon ended up in ‘Dog’ Co., 7th Cav Regt. After sharing a fifth of 
whiskey with his company commander one evening, T/Sgt Sheldon got 
permission to develop the nucleus of a K-9 group. A trip to Pusan was 
authorized so T/Sgt Sheldon could acquire, at his own expense, the needed 
tools of the trade. He returned to the front lines with dog food, choke 
chains, leather leashes, leather harnesses, leather saddle bags (fashioned 
by Korean artisans) and bowels to feed the dogs. T/Sgt Sheldon was very 
persuasive in gaining support for his project.  
Dogs needed for this startup effort were bought, begged, borrowed and 
stolen from the Korean civilian population. Platoon personnel were 
volunteers, friends of T/Sgt. Sheldon in ‘Dog’ Co. All activity/training 
was authorized to take place only during times when the unit wasn’t 
engaged in active combat with the enemy. Our training as handlers was 
very much like what you might see on current TV programs on the 
subject.  
 After the period of training had proved to the upper command that this 
was a desirable tool, the unit was transferred from Dog Co. to Regimental 
Hq. & Hq. Co., and was led by 1st Lt. Ted Cook, who undertook the job in 
addition to his original assignment. A period of more formal training was 
scheduled, and was to span about a month in duration. At that time 
additional personnel were authorized, and recruited by the existing platoon 
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members. I was a member of “C” Co. at that time and was recruited by 
Pvt. James D. Matty, Snowshoe, P.A., who I had befriended on board ship. 
The deal as proposed to me included a month free of combat to train the 
unit to a degree T/Sgt Sheldon considered combat ready. (McKelvey, 
2005)  
Even with these challenges, some basic policies emerged during the Korean War.  
The dog teams worked mainly on night patrols and were given 24 to 48 hours’ notice of 
an expected mission.  The notice was to allow the handler and dog to prepare and meet 
with the patrol members so the dog could become more familiar with their individual 
scents.  This time also allowed the dog handlers to brief the patrol leaders and members 
on the dog’s capabilities and limitations so they knew what they could expect. 
In Korea the dogs again proved their worth, as Bert Deaner noted in a report dated 
February 1953: 
The dogs could scent best on level terrain.  Mountains and hills tend to 
make the wind swirl, and an alert at one hundred yards from the enemy in 
these locations was considered very good.  Still, there were times when the 
dog did not scent until thirty feet from his quarry.  It was also difficult for 
the dog to scent someone on higher ground than the patrol, since scent 
often rises like smoke.  But although the dog might not pick up the scent 
due to the terrain, his keen sense of hearing would also provide an alert—
perhaps not as reliable, though (Lemish, pp. 157-159).    
According to Lemish: 
One thing was for certain: The Chinese did not like the American dogs.  
Many handlers found out that in close-quarter fighting, the Chinese or 
North Koreans would try to kill the dog immediately….By all accounts, 
the success of ambush and reconnaissance patrols at night struck a certain 
fear in the Chinese and North Koreans alike (p. 158).  
The limitations and capabilities of the dogs paralleled those discovered in World 
War II.  However, there were concerns about the utilization of dogs as seen in a memo 
from the Seventh Infantry Division, which states, “Several instances have been noted 
wherein maximum benefit was not obtained due to improper utilization of the dogs and a 
lack of understanding as to their capabilities and limitations” (p. 160).  Success was 
determined by the team’s ability to work together.  As Lemish quotes a former scout dog 
handler, Robert Kollar, “You can have the best dog in the world.  But if the guy on the 
other end of the leash doesn’t understand his dog, cannot pick up the subtle alert, then 
someone is going to get killed.” 
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The Korean War also highlighted some other aspects of using dogs in combat.  
Even after training, dogs could differ greatly on what they alerted on and how they 
displayed their alerts.  Dogs of the same breed would scent from the ground, while others 
favored airborne scents.  Some dogs would alert to suspicious sounds while some would 
not and would instead check for any type of movement (pp. 160-161).  It was the handler 
who had to determine and “read” his dog through his understanding of that particular 
dog. 
After the Korean War, the Army closed the training facility at Fort Carson, 
Colorado.  The Army at this time, “cited little need of the animals for its own use and 
said it wished to demobilize the entire canine force” (p. 163).  The reason seems to have 
been economic, even though it cost only about 55 cents a day to maintain a dog.  The Air 
Force, meanwhile sought to continue its sentry dog program in order to secure airfields, 
equipment storage facilities, and, specifically, missile sites.  While the Air Force 
expanded its program, the Army scaled back its program, until the 26th Infantry Scout 
Dog Platoon (IPSD) was once again the sole remaining Army unit.  The platoon was 
based at Fort Benning, Georgia.  In 1958, the Air Force took ownership of the US 
military effort vis a vis dogs, when it established the Sentry Dog Training Branch of the 
Department of Security Police Training at Lackland Air Force Base, near San Antonio, 
Texas.  Because the Army Quartermaster Corps was unable to procure the number of 
dogs required for the Air Force program in June 1964, the Air Force took over the 
responsibility of procurement as well. 
The Army at this point had to purchase its dogs from the Air Force.  The 
procurement of adequate dogs of high quality continued to be an issue due to the 
competition from police departments and security firms for the best qualified dogs.   
F. CONCLUSIONS   
1.  The US military has continually been reluctant to use dogs in combat or in the 
military.  While other militaries have successfully exploited the capabilities of dogs, the 
US did not grasp the benefits early in any conflict.  The US depended on other countries 
for the capability during World War I.  Even thereafter, other countries maintained their 
dog programs as they prepared for the next war. 
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2.  The training methods to adequately develop an effective program have not 
always been clearly understood by those who implement the programs.  This has been 
demonstrated by the consistent lack of success in the early stages of a dog programs.  
Usually, there are too few qualified trainers or a lack of trainers and others that are 
realistic about what can be achieved. 
3.  Finding qualified experts has been an issue throughout US history.  Each 
conflict produces a cadre of experts who could be used to further develop dog programs 
and improve their effectiveness.  However, the military typically deactivates successful 
programs at the conclusion of a conflict.   
4.  The use of dogs in combat seems to improve and develop with each conflict, 
but the lessoned learns in the past have to be relearned due to lack of experienced 
personnel deactivation of programs.   
5.  Military leaders rarely seem to sufficiently appreciate the capabilities that dogs 
can provide or what it takes to develop those capabilities.  If military leaders clearly 
understood the tactical advantages that dogs can provide, programs would be maintained 
since they are relatively inexpensive.  Instead, the default focus is on technological and 
equipment improvements.   
6.  Procurement of animals with the required qualities is a continual problem.  
Since the programs are not continually maintained, an adequate and consistent 
procurement system is not kept in place.  No program has had the quality or numbers of 
dogs, handlers, or trainers needed once the military leadership decides to once again use 
dogs in combat. 
7.  Dogs enhance the capabilities of dismounted patrols in combat.  This has been 
demonstrated by hundreds of personnel accounts throughout history.  The desire for this 
capability has led some units to develop their own programs in the field. 
8.  Scout dogs and sentry dogs have made the most significant contributions to the 
US military in combat.  The US history of successfully using dogs is predominately in 
these areas through the Korean War. 
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III. THE VIETNAM DOG TEAMS 
A. AN OVERVIEW OF THE PROGRAMS USED IN VIETNAM 
The United States conducted the Vietnam War via the use of massive firepower 
that was intended to overwhelm the enemy’s will to fight.  Yet, even though massive 
firepower was used, Soldiers and Marines still had to walk through the jungle and find 
and fix the enemy in order to destroy him.  The problem was that the US was fighting on 
unfamiliar, foreign soil against an enemy that fought in a manner that made engagement 
by our preferred methods—and superior technology and firepower—difficult.  Also, prior 
to the arrival of US troops, the enemy in Vietnam had combat experience on the same 
terrain, having already defeating the French.  The jungle provided the concealment that 
allowed the VietCong (VC) to attack US patrols and then virtually disappear without a 
trace.  The freedom of action that the VC enjoyed in conducting operations had to be 
challenged in order to curb the rising US casualties as the US became more involved in 
the war.    
Significant American involvement in Vietnam began around 1960.  The Military 
Assistance Advisory Group, Vietnam (MAAGV), “recommended the establishment of a 
military dog program for the Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN).  Some 
American advisers were familiar with the British use of dogs to put down the Communist 
insurrection in Malaysia.” (Lemish, 1996, p. 167).  The US military advisors hoped that 
the British successes using dogs in Malaysia could be duplicated by the Americans and 
ARVN.  According to Jesse Mendez, who acted as one of the American scout dog 
advisors to the South Vietnamese as part of the MAAGV program, the program was 
plagued by problems from its inception.  In an earlier thesis written by Mary Murry, 
Mendez provided the following information: “The Vietnamese viewed dogs as a source 
of food and deliberately assigned soldiers of poor performance to the handler program.  
Due to limited resources, the ARVN forces could not and would not provide nutritious 
diet to the dogs and many suffered and even died from malnutrition” (Murry, 1998, p. 1).  
Additionally, Lemish notes, “in the years that followed, even with support from the US 
Veterinary Corps members, nearly 90 percent of the ARVN dogs’ deaths would be 
attributed to malnutrition” (p. 169). In September 1964, the ARVN had 327 dogs and by 
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1966 the ARVN had only 50 scout and 80 sentry dogs (p. 172).  The ARVN also did not 
have a single veterinarian on staff.  Also according to  Murry, “many of the dogs that did 
survive the initial training phase suffered a high casualty rate due to the abbreviated 
training and lack of ARVN understanding as to the correct employment of the animals” 
(pp. 1-2).   
The problems that were generated by the abbreviated training were quite obvious 
to the American advisors:  the ARVN were employing the dogs improperly.  The ARVN 
commanders did not, or would not; understand the capabilities that the dog team provided 
to a patrol.  According to Mendez, for instance, the ARVN would place sentry dogs on 
patrols.  The sentry dogs were extremely aggressive and trained to bark on alert.  This 
meant that many of the ARVN patrols locations were compromised by the dog teams or 
that the dogs attacked fellow patrol members.  As the word filtered from the patrols to 
other ARVN units, the dog teams became even more unwelcome.  However, the advisers 
kept recommending that the dogs be used, so they were, but their ability to make a 
contribution to the patrol was minimized by the manner in which they were used. 
When we first got there we had a heck of a mess.  The Air Force had 
trained many sentry/attack dogs and some were being used by the ARVN 
infantry units out in the field.  These dogs would bark on patrol missions 
posing a serious problem.  On top of that, they wanted to attack and chew 
up the friendly patrol members.  The only type of dog that would work out 
on patrol was a silent scout dog.  It took a while to get these dogs 
exchanged out.  Eventually we got trained dogs to each of the five ARVN 
infantry scout dog platoons spread out across each Corps area. (Murry, 
p.34)  
Mendez would accompany many of the ARVN patrols in an attempt to maximize 
the dog team’s capability, but found that many patrol leaders did not trust the dog and did 
not want the dogs or the American advisors on the patrol.  “In the fall of 1961 MAAGV 
recommended that 468 sentry dogs and 538 scout dogs be sent to RVN.  These dogs were 
purchased privately, since the US military did not possess the required number in its 
inventory” (Lemish, 1996, p. 169).  This showed that, once again, the US procurement 
process was not prepared for the numbers of dogs and handlers required during a war.   
According to Mendez, few of the advisors had served in Korea and had little 
combat experience prior to Vietnam.  The MAAGV program reveals that the Army’s lack 
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of institutional knowledge.  While those who implemented the programs, such as Jesse 
Mendez, were extremely knowledgeable, many of the leaders based their decisions on a 
set of assumptions that may or may not have been correct.  Assumptions, such as the 
notion that the South Vietnamese would embrace the use of dogs once their capabilities 
were demonstrated to the South Vietnamese commanders, proved to be false; few 
Vietnamese commanders wanted to use dogs on the patrols.  Many commanders thought 
of the dogs as food, not as a combat multiplier.    The US advisors also assumed that the 
Vietnamese would properly employ the dogs once they were trained.  This assumption 
also proved to be false.  According to Mendez, the South Vietnamese took trained sentry 
dogs on a few patrols with disastrous results.  The sentry dogs either barked and revealed 
their position or attacked fellow patrol members.   
Even with the setbacks demonstrated by the use of scout and sentry dogs by the 
ARVN, there is evidence of some early successes.  The memorandum included in 
Appendix A is the guide for scout dog platoons provide by the Office of Senior Advisor 
in Vietnam.  This guide was released as an attempt to enhance the effectiveness of the 
platoons and outline the requirements for a successful program.  The items in the guide 
are reflected in the earlier military dog manual, FM 20-20: Military Dog Training and 
Employment, dated April 1960.  They were also included in the FM 7-40, Scout Dog 
Training and Employment, dated 1973.  The wording is somewhat different, but the 
general principles remain the same.  For instance, one key rule states, “The dog must be 
trained for only one job.” Another point of interest is that the reward system for the dog 
was to be based not only on “praise and petting,” but also by accomplishing a mission. 
At the same time, scout dog teams proved their worth.  “The guerrilla tactics of 
the Vietcong were taking their toll on the American forces, and it became apparent that 
additional measures had to be taken to slow the casualty rates within the infantry.  The 
answer would be the reactivation of the scout dog program” (Murry, 1998, p. 35).  The 
US military had a tremendous problem procuring an adequate number of dogs.  One 
reason was that the German Shepherd Club withdrew its support when a rumor circulated 
that dogs were not being adequately received in Vietnam and that a shipment of dogs had 
been sold as food.  While the rumor was never confirmed, the damage to the program’s 
reputation added to the difficulties of procuring quality animals.   
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At this point, the Air Force still had the responsibility of procuring the required 
numbers for the Department of Defense.  The US was already using sentry dogs in Korea, 
Japan, and Thailand at the beginning of the Vietnam conflict.  In 1965, “the director of 
security and law enforcement for the air force believed that the tropical climate would be 
too oppressive for the animals and they would be ineffective.  Obviously, he had not been 
informed that ARVN forces were already using German shepherds…” (Lemish, 1996, p. 
173), once again demonstrating that the decision makers and the military in general did 
not understand the capabilities of dog teams and their ability to adapt to the environment.  
If the decision makers had been informed about past dog programs, then they would have 
known that dogs had been used in tropical climates during World War II.  
Once an appreciation for the potential of dogs to save American lives in Vietnam 
was finally realized, a number of different military dog programs were initiated.  The 
military working dog programs and dog teams developed the five categories of: 
1.  Sentry – extremely aggressive dogs used by Military and Security 
Police for physical security of general storage yards, airfields, ammunition 
supply points, petroleum storage areas, food storage areas, docks, and 
convalescent centers.  Eventually their aggressiveness led to their 
replacement, the patrol dog. 
2.  Scout – used by Infantry and Military Police to detect primarily any 
human scent while on patrol and trained to operate silently.  They were 
usually the lead element of a patrol of infantry.  They were also used as 
flank and rear security.  They also proved useful for supporting outposts 
and ambush sites, as member of reconnaissance teams, and in the search of 
hamlets.  Scout dogs were also trained to detect snipers, wires, booby 
traps, and mines, and other enemy locations. 
3.  Tracker – used by the Infantry to follow a particular scent to locate the 
enemy or sometimes friendly locations.  The teams assisted US combat 
units in maintaining contact with the Vietcong in jungle areas.    
4.  Mine/Tunnel – used by the Infantry to detect mines and explosives as 
well as determine the location of enemy tunnels.  They had some 
successes, but unfortunately they were not “a foolproof detection system.” 
5.  Narcotics – used by the Military and Security Police to determine the 
location of hidden narcotics (Thornton, 1990, p. 5-6). 
“At the height of the conflict, the United States had some 6,000 MWDs in its 
world-wide inventory of which over 1,100 were in Vietnam” (p. 5). 
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While all of the dog programs in Vietnam had numerous successes, I will focus 
on the scout dog program in order to limit the scope of this thesis.  Fortunately, many of 
the lessons learned by the other programs are reflected in the scout dog program, and, in 
addition, the US had prior experience in developing scout dog programs, though again 
many of the lessons from World War II and Korea had to be relearned during Vietnam.  
By 1965, the US decided to begin a more aggressive, offensive role in Vietnam.  
This meant an expansion of US forces to be deployed to Vietnam.   
For the Vietcong this made little difference in their tactics.  Since the 
Americans had intervened, they always attacked when everything was to 
their advantage.  A quick strike and they melted back into the jungle or 
countryside.  The VC ambushes on American patrols increased 
dramatically.  Trip wires, bamboo whips, and punji pits took their toll both 
physically and psychologically.  The Vietcong were everywhere—yet 
often nowhere to be found (Lemish, p. 182). 
The US used the World War II tactics of heavy firepower, whereas the Vietcong 
fought using guerrilla tactics.  A tactical solution was thus needed to counter the 
increasing number of American casualties.  As Jesse Mendez says, “Ever since the 
Vietnam War began, Charlie has been hitting only when everything has been to his 
advantage.”  The Army reactivated its Scout Dog Program in 1965 in the hopes that this 
would help minimize the Vietcong’s advantages.  The scout dogs would alert to any 
unfamiliar odor, mostly in the air but also on the ground.  Along with scent the dog could 
use its other senses to detect and alert to possible dangers.  The specific capabilities 
varied with each individual dog and handler.  Official Army reports noted that in ideal 
conditions of wind and terrain, the scout dog in Vietnam was easily able to detect 
personnel 500 meters away (Murry, p. 46).  
 Jesse Mendez redeployed from his position as an advisor on scout dogs to the 
ARVN just in time to participate in the reactivation of the Army’s scout dog program at 
Fort Benning, Georgia.  Mendez was a primary trainer in the 26th IPSD at Fort Benning 
from 1966 to 1969, when he retired from the military.  Initially the 26th IPSD (the 
personnel listing is included in Appendix B) was to undergo a one-time expansion to 
support the war.  However, the Army later identified that the requirement had been 
underestimated and thirteen infantry scout dog platoons and three Marine platoons were  
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added to the force structure.  This was the first time since World War II that the Marines 
were expected to use scout dogs, since only the Army had used scout dogs during the 
Korean War.   
Due to the success of the scout dog program demonstrated by the Marines and 
Army, the Air Force began its own scout dog program at Lackland AFB.  Fort Benning 
could not support the Air Force program due to the short notice of the requirement and 
the concurrent level of demand for scout dogs from the Army and Marines Corps.  As 
successful as the Air Force was with sentry dogs, its scout dog program was plagued by 
commanders who did not understand the new scout dog’s capability.  The lack of 
understanding meant that the dogs were used as sentry or patrol dogs and were not used 
to maximize their scout dog training (Lemish, p. 190).  
The mission of the scout dog was to support tactical units and to give silent 
warning of any foreign presence outside the main body by: 
1.  Warning against ambushes. 
2.  Warning against snipers. 
3.  Detecting enemy hideouts or stay behind groups. 
4.  Detecting enemy caches or food, ammunition, and weapons. 
5.  Detecting mines and booby traps. 
6. [Early] warning of the enemy’s approach to ambush patrols [US patrols 
with the mission of ambushing the enemy] and [US] listening posts 
(Murry, p. 42). 
Not surprisingly, the expansion of the scout dog program strained the 
procurement process’s ability to acquire the sufficient numbers.  “This problem could be 
attributed to a high rejection rate of 30 to 50 percent of the potential canine recruits.  
Competition with civilians and private security firms also hampered military 
procurement” (Lemish, 1996, p. 184).  The rapid expansion also led to a shortage of 
qualified handlers and instructors.  The author of the book Dog Tags of Courage, John 
Burnam, was trained “on the job” to be a dog handler and recruited to a dog platoon 
while he was an infantryman in Vietnam.  This was due to the lack of qualified, trained 
handlers available to fill the personnel shortages at the time.  Even though Fort Benning 
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was producing a number of trained handlers and dogs, the risks inherent to continually 
operating at the “point” of a patrol and the expansion of the program led to an overall 
shortage of personnel.  Also, the scout dog handlers were volunteers and known hazards 
of the job limited the number of volunteers: 
…[Their] three to five day missions involved silently walking ahead of a 
unit and providing warning to the men of possible ambushed and booby 
traps. The shortage of scout dog teams and their “as needed” assignment 
did not allow time for the handler and his dog to train with the unit they 
were supporting.  Often times there was little warning given to the handler 
as to the mission on which he was to embark, making a dangerous task 
that much more psychologically demanding (Murry, p. 43).    
As Jim Black, a former dog handler from the 37th IPSD notes: 
It was a nerve-wracking and dangerous assignment some have equated 
with defusing unexploded bombs.  Dog teams combat-assaulted by 
helicopter into enemy-infested jungles and immediately began leading the 
way down well used enemy trails with fresh tracks in front of them. 
Often a handler jumped off a chopper and reported to the CO, then went 
directly to the point.  Moving quietly through enemy-held territory when 
the “pucker factor” is high is not the best place to strike up a conversation.  
Only after a few days in the field did the regulars actually get to know the 
handler and the dog by name.  Most handlers had only a nodding 
acquaintance with the men of the host unit (Murry, p. 45). 
Initially, only 40 percent of the instructors at Fort Benning had been to Vietnam 
(p. 184).  This lack of experience about the conditions in Vietnam led to some of the 
initial problems with the program.  Fortunately, instructors with Vietnam experience, like 
Jesse Mendez, clearly understood the role that the new handlers would have to fill when 
on patrol. 
The complexity and challenges of training dogs and handlers cannot be 
overstated.  As Sgt. Charles Paris, a training NCO from the 26th IPSD, put it, “These dogs 
are just like humans.  Some are quick to learn and others are slow-witted.  Some 
cooperate and others are stubborn.  You don’t know what to expect until the dog and man 
start working together” (Lemish, p. 185).   
Some of the early problems were that the dogs were not accustomed to shotguns 
and flares.  The heat was also a problem until the dogs acclimatized to the environment in 
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Vietnam.  Dogs required more water than a man operating in the same conditions.  
Another risk generated by the scout dogs on a patrol was a concern that they: 
…instilled a false sense of security and overconfidence in the men on 
patrol.  Scout dogs were suppose to instill confidence, and they did, but 
the confidence sometimes overwhelmed the men’s good judgments, 
making them careless.  They began to feel invincible which, of course, 
they were not. (Kelch, 1982, p. 38) 
Even with these problems, 1st Lt. Ronald Neubauer noted, “Although people have 
to be convinced that the dogs will be a positive use to them, once a unit uses dogs, they 
always come back for more.  At times, requests had to be turned down because of the 
limited number of dogs available” (p. 185).  Neubauer’s observation is reflective of the 
earlier comments made by handlers and advocates from World War II and the Korean 
War.  As Neubauer also pointed out, “It has been estimated that well over two thousand 
Marine lives have been saved since the insertion of the 1st Scout Dog Platoon into 
Vietnam” (p. 187). 
Far more reminiscent of WWII experiences was Neubauer’s statement that, “We 
never had a patrol ambushed that has had a dog along.  The dog has always managed to 
sniff out the danger and force the VC to show his hand before he wanted to” (Lemish, p. 
186).  But also, as in WWII, not all field commanders understood how best to take 
advantage of scout dogs. 
Nevertheless, the Vietnam scout dog and handler training program that was 
executed at Fort Benning has been described as a very successful program.  One way to 
quantify its success is to use the summary (Figure 1, 2, and 3) created by Jesse Mendez.  
His summary includes over 1,100 monthly After Action Reports (AARs).  These reports 
are entitled, “Monthly Report of Scout Dog Operations” (Figure 4 and Figure 5 are 
examples of these reports from the various dog units that operated in Vietnam).  
Mendez’s summary illustrates the large number of patrols that were accompanied by 
scout dog teams.  The fact that the Vietcong placed a considerable bounty on each dog 
speaks to their effectiveness.  The bounty was collected if the Vietcong soldier turned in 
one of the scout dog’s tattooed ears as proof.  The Vietcong also had a standing order that 
if a scout dog team was encountered, the dog should be shot first and then the handler 
because of the capability that the dog represented.  Jesse Mendez makes it clear that his 
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report does not include all of the available data, but is the result of his best efforts to 
compile the data from numerous visits to the National Archives and other sources.  
Mendez has not found any indications during his extensive research that anyone, beside 
himself, has made an effort to collect the dog unit data from Vietnam into one document.  
 
Figure 1.   Page 1 of Jesse Mendez’s Results 
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Figure 3.   Page 3 of Jesse Mendez’s Results 
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The scout dog program created and utilized some important concepts.  Former 
handlers credit these for the high level of success of the program.  The Monthly Report of 
Scout Dog Operations is one such concept.  It was a simple easy-to-use form that allowed 
results to be collected.  This form provided a means to gather data on a variety of items, 
such as the number of days that the dogs from a platoon supported units, the types and 
number of patrols, the medical status of the various dogs, and any benefits derived or 
lessons learned due to the presence of a scout dog on the patrols.  The examples 
illustrated in the following figures were not selected for any particular reason, but were 
pulled as random examples from Mendez’s collection of 1,100 of these monthly reports.  
 
Figure 4.   Example of a Monthly Report of Scout Dog Operations 
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Figure 5.   Example of a Monthly Report of Scout Dog Operations  
 
Another item of interest is the Operational Readiness Test (ORT), (see Appendix 
A).  According to Mendez, the ORT was one of the keys to the success of the program.  It 
was used to evaluate a scout dog team. in a number of realistic scenarios that had been 
created based on experiences from Vietnam.  Evaluators were independent of the dog 
program and were instructed regarding the standards by which each team was to be 
evaluated.  The evaluators, student handlers, and instructors knew that this evaluation or 
test was the last chance to identify problems before having to face the real dangers in 
Vietnam, so the evaluators, student handlers, and instructors who participated took the 
ORT very seriously. 
From all accounts by former scout dog handlers, the training conducted at Fort 
Benning was, “successful due in great part to the outstanding training received by 
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handlers and dogs alike at Fort Benning” (Murry, 1998, p. 40).  During my visit with 
Jesse Mendez in Columbus and Fort Benning, Georgia, he recounted that many dog team 
members, upon completing their requisite combat tour in Vietnam, volunteered to finish 
their Army tours as instructors at Fort Benning.  Their primary goal was to inject realism 
into the training.  As the primary instructor who developed the scout dog curriculum and 
authored the program of instruction, Mendez is credited by many with having been a 
major force in instilling realism into the training.   
Mendez based the training on his experiences walking patrols in Vietnam as a 
military advisor with the ARVN.  He even helped develop a training area that was a 
replica of a Vietnamese village, complete with live farm animals.  Training patrols were 
also very long in order to develop the team’s stamina and to ensure the handler 
understood how to recognize fatigue and heat exhaustion in the dog and himself.  
Mechanized infantry units at Fort Benning also assisted with the training.  The dog teams 
would learn to mount and ride inside the armored vehicles and then practiced 
dismounting and working an objective area.  The training exercises consisted of a long 
movement in the vehicles, firing from the vehicles, reacting to ambushes while moving to 
an objective, etc.  Even helicopter support was incorporated.  The helicopters would 
shoot blank rounds from above their positions to simulate combat conditions experienced 
in Vietnam.  The teams were trained to travel in all military vehicles to include 
helicopters.  The teams even qualified to rappel from helicopters.  Mendez also 
conducted a HALO parachute jump with a dog to test that capability.  In short, diverse 
and realistic training was critical since a dog team could be called to support any unit in 
Vietnam immediately upon graduation.   
The availability of infantry and other combat arms units at Fort Benning 
facilitated and provided essential support for various aspects of training.  Many times, 
according to Mendez, the dog teams would support other training conducted at Fort 
Benning, such as at Ranger School.  Hy Rothstein, a professor at the Naval Postgraduate 
School and former Special Forces Battalion Commander, remembers having to lead a 
patrol to which a scout dog was attached during Ranger School in 1974.  He was 
evaluated on how well he incorporated the dog team’s capabilities into the patrol. 
Rothstein said that the dog team was very effective during the training patrol.      
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Due to the successes of the scout and sentry dog programs in Vietnam, the 
military began exploring expanding K-9 roles and exploiting the capabilities of dog teams 
in combat.  Some of these programs developed problems similar to those experienced 
when Pandre was awarded his contract in WWII, while others were quite successful.   
For instance in 1969, the US Army Limited Warfare Laboratory (USALWL) 
decided that something like M-dogs from World War II might be useful in Vietnam.  
Research had been conducted on using dogs to detect mines at the British War Dog 
Training Center and at the Stanford Research Institute after World War II.  Although 
results of the British and Stanford experiments were not encouraging (p. 198), mines and 
booby traps still proved a constant menace in Vietnam.  On roads and in open areas, 
mechanical mine detectors were effective, but in the jungle these devices were not useful.  
The USALWL contracted a civilian company to establish a mine detection program.    
The civilian company that was contracted by USALWL was called Behavior 
Systems, Inc. (BSI) which, according to Perry Money, a former Marines Corps handler of 
a BSI dog, deployed 56 Army dogs in 1969 and 28 Marine Corps dogs in 1970.  The 
training doctrine was written and administered by two civilians who, at the time, held 
Master’s Degrees in Animal Behavioral Psychology.  BSI initially trained fourteen dogs 
to detect mines, booby traps, and trips wires, and another fourteen to detect and locate 
tunnels only.  Each dog produced by BSI cost approximately $10,000 (Lemish, p. 201). 
According to Mr. Money, “Their primary focus was on a dual system called “conditioned 
reflex and positive reinforcement.”  BSI civilians traveled to South Vietnam with the 
Marines and their new dogs.  
The BSI program led to the formation of the 60th Infantry Platoon at Fort Gordon.  
Its formal designation was the 60th Infantry Platoon (Scout Dog) (Mine/Tunnel Detector 
Dog) (White, 1969, p. I-1). The BSI mine dogs were assigned a variety of missions 
including Reconnaissance in Force (RIF), sweeps, search and destroy (clear), land 
clearing operations, and road sweeps (p. II-2).  The handlers would make clear to the 
support unit leader the dog team’s capabilities and limitations prior to the mission.  The 
handler would also inform the leader that the dog should not be made to walk a tiring 
distance, i.e., two or more kilometers, before the dog was committed to an active search 
role (p. II-2). 
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The mine dog handler typically ranged 5 to 20 meters behind the dog, and the 
supported unit leader followed 20-50 meters behind the handler.  The terrain dictated 
many of the distances because line of sight was needed to allow for the recognition of the 
alert by the handler and for safety and survivability of the dog team.  The dog handler 
would mainly use hand signals to direct the movement of the dog, so if the dog could not 
see the handler, then the directions could not be given.  Some attempts to use transmitters 
on the dogs were made in an attempt to give the handler greater flexibility in using the 
dog in limited visibility.  One such attempt was called the Remote Control of War Dogs 
(Remotely Controlled Scout Dog) conducted for the US Army Land Warfare Laboratory 
(Romba, 1974, pp. 1-55).   
The major objective of the study on remote controls was to develop procedures by 
which a dog handler could control the direction of off-leash movement of his dog by 
remote means in an unrestricted environment.  The experiment used tones as commands 
to the dog.  Similar experimental work is being currently done at Auburn University.  The 
1974 experiments pointed to problems at greater distances due to the difficulties of 
providing immediate positive reinforcement to the dogs when they were behaving 
appropriately.  The study concluded that a scout dog could be trained to operate off leash 
up to ½ mile away from the handler using radio-transmitted signals.  The experiments 
indicated that the change-direction command was the most difficult for the dog to learn.  
The overall intent of the experiments was to create a baseline of information that could be 
used to further develop, refine, and standardize, “techniques for the large scale 
production of highly trained war dogs” (Romba, p. 46).  The closing comment and 
recommendation made by John Romba, who wrote the Final Report: Remote Control of 
War Dogs (Remotely Controlled Scout Dog) in 1974 for the US Army Warfare 
Laboratory, noted, “Command emphasis should be given to the need for improving 
current military dog capabilities and training procedures with the ultimate objective of 
providing, at least on a stand-by basis, a proven capability for the rapid, large scale 
production of highly trained war dogs” (Romba, p. 47). 
One reason to experiment with the extended off-leash method of dog handling 
was to increase the distance between the dog and personnel so that the handler’s 
survivability might be enhanced if a mine or booby trap was detonated in the dog’s 
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vicinity.  The 60th Infantry Platoon (Scout Dog) (Mine/Tunnel Detector Dog) had a 
limited off-leash capability as described earlier, and there were a number of casualties.  
One casualty in the 60th IPSD, for example, occurred with a handler on his first support 
mission: 
His mine dog responded correctly on three occasions to trip wire devices.  
The dog made a fourth correct response and as the handler approached the 
dog he fainted from heat exhaustion, falling on the trip wire.  A grenade 
exploded wounding both handler and dog (White, 1969, p. II-5). 
With regard to the 28 Marine BSI-trained dogs, consider the statistics Perry C. 
Money collected based on his first-hand experiences.6  The data that Money has collected 
based on his experience suggest the following: 
1.  Number of BSI trained Dogs assigned   --  28 
2.  Number of Dogs Killed in Action – 6 
 Of the (6) Killed in Action: 
a. Command Detonation after the dog found the device  -- 1 
b. Shot by sniper – 1 
c. As a result of missing the device or actually setting it off – 4 
3.  Number of Dogs Missing in Action – 1 
4.  Number of Dogs Died of Unknown Causes --  1 
5.  Number of Handlers Killed in Action  –  6 
6.  Officers Killed in Action --  1 
7.  Total Number of USMC personnel assigned to the project fro March 1970 to 
June 1971 --  50. 
Mr. Money does not consider this to be a high casualty rate, considering all 
factors involved.  The Army unit, the 60th Infantry Platoon (Scout Dog) (Mine/Tunnel 
Detector Dog), had a reported 25 percent casualty rate (White, 1969, p. II-5).  White’s 
report states that in the case of the 60th Infantry Platoon (Scout Dog) (Mine/Tunnel 
Detector Dog), there were “no handler losses due to the dog’s performance” (White, II-
5).  The casualties described in detail in the report seem to have been caused by combat  
 
 
                                                 
6 His numbers are slightly different from those that appear in the “Final Report”, by B. White 
evaluating the effectiveness of the BSI program, which was written at the end of the 260 day trial period 
because the Marine unit operated for another six months after the “Final Report” was issued.   
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or environmental conditions while the dogs were not being actively employed.  In other 
words, the deaths were not caused by a failure of one of the dogs to warn the handler of 
danger on the job.   
Perry Money’s assessment of the BSI program is that, “You get what you pay 
for,” which was approximately $15,000 per dog, an amount somewhat different from 
Lemish’s figure.  Money believes that, “The (2) civilians from BSI were ‘War 
Protestors’,  but not anti-American, I think they firmly believed that they were creating a 
defensive weapon that would reduce US casualties, while not increasing enemy 
casualties.  Long haired hippie looking, but they were there with us every step of the way 
until we hit the bush.”   The current programs that are being created to counter the 
Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs) employed by insurgents in Iraq share at least some 
of the same attributes, including the reliance on contractors.  But there may be other 
similarities worth considering as well.  For instance, dogs, like humans, are susceptible to 
the heat and humidity.  Supported unit leaders in Vietnam would at times make the dogs 
walk farther than the recommended distances before working.  In one case, a mine dog 
was forced during a road sweep to cover twenty-one miles of hard surface road in only 
seven hours (Lemish, p. 203).  The overuse and abuse of the dog caused injuries that then 
rendered it ineffective.  At the end of the trial, patrol leaders evaluated the mine/tunnel 
dogs.  Gunfire and explosions caused adverse reactions in about 50 percent of the dogs in 
the 60th.  Some dogs attempted to run away as a consequence and, when caught, “whined, 
whimpered, and cowered.”  In extreme cases, dogs were ineffective for 30 minutes to an 
hour (White, 1969, II-10). About 85 percent of the supported unit commanders believed 
that dogs enhance security, 12 percent thought they had no effect, and 3 percent felt the 
dog teams were a hindrance to security and performed poorly (White, p. II-7). Even 
though the program was considered a success, a future contract was not awarded to BSI.   
According to Lemish the performance of the BSI dogs deteriorated as the war 
continued.   This deterioration was mainly due to issues created when handlers began to 
deviate from the original training regimen.  New handlers arrived and each one had less 
experience and training than the previous one.  This led to idiosyncratic and non-
standardized personal training techniques being introduced which could only have 
confused the dogs. (Lemish, pp. 204-205).    
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Other programs evolved as offshoots of the Vietnam Scout Dog Program.  One 
was the “Superdog Program” as part of the Biosensor Research project.  This program 
was an attempt to selectively breed dogs with fewer health problems, thereby increasing 
the length of use of the dog along with the development of a “superior ambush detection 
dog” (Lemish, p. 216).  The program involved a range of people from different career 
fields involved.  Nothing conclusive appears to have been published or disseminated 
about the experiment.  At first glance, it might appear that Lackland AFB’s “puppy 
program” has similar objectives today.  However, the “puppy program” seems much 
more a response to continual procurement issues.   
The US Army Combined Arms Combat Development Agency considered the 
development of “the infantry tactical dog.”  The concept was to combine the skills of the 
scout, tracker, and mine/tunnel dog into one all-purpose animal.  This was a cost-saving 
measure.  The program only lasted three month before it was cancelled (Lemish, p. 216).  
Most people seem to believe that the capability was neither realistic nor attainable. 
Meanwhile, what is perhaps most striking is that many current handlers are not 
aware that earlier attempts were made similar to their current efforts to develop effective 
programs.  Yet, the lessons learned by members of these earlier units could be of 
tremendous use and value.  At the very least, more information about these earlier 
attempts needs to be collected and the expertise of these former handlers tapped.  This 
should be a major priority for current program managers, contractors, and handlers.7 
B. CONCLUSIONS 
1.  The assumption that other militaries will use dogs similarly is erroneous.  Just 
as Japanese in WW II did not use dogs in the same manner or roles as the Germans, even 
though they received trained war dogs from Germany, the South Vietnamese had a 
different attitude toward dogs than did their American Advisors.  This made their use by 
                                                 
7 Although, the scout dog platoons continued to make contributions for the remainder of the war, dogs 
that were deployed and used in Vietnam were left in Vietnam.  The military regarded K-9s as equipment.  
Only 120 dogs were shipped back to the US.  The remaining dogs were handed over to the ARVN troops.  
The dogs’ final disposition once handed over is open to speculation (Lemish, p. 236).  Many former 
handlers wanted to bring their dogs back to the US and demilitarize them as in World War II, but Army 
policy prohibited this. Also, the US public was not fully aware of the fate of the dogs at the conclusion of 
the Vietnam War, when so many other problems were facing the military.  At the time, the dogs’ fates were 
not a priority or a concern to any but their handlers and those whose lives so many of them saved. 
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Vietnamese/ARVN problematic.  This lesson may need to be borne in mind as we 
encourage the use of MWDs in Iraq and elsewhere. 
2.  The success of a tactical dog program requires realistic training.  The dog and 
handler must be trained in conditions that simulate their future operating environment. 
The scout dog training program made continual adjustments class to class based on 
feedback from handlers in Vietnam, the monthly AARs, and thanks to handlers from 
Vietnam who returned to become instructors at Fort Benning. 
3.  The job or task of being a scout dog handler or a dog team operating on 
“point” of a patrol is extremely taxing.  This means that training is even more important 
so that the handler can concentrate on the dynamic variables in the environment and not 
on controlling his dog or their integration with the patrol.  A dog handler should have 
extensive patrolling expertise and have experience working with the unit that the team 
will support.  If the dog handler has not had experience with a particular unit, then time 
must be made for the dog team to become comfortable with the supported unit and the 
members of the patrol.  The particular patrol should rehearse battle drills with the dog 
team to ensure that both the dog team and the patrol members know what to expect from 
each other.  During the Korean War, efforts were made to allow for this introductory 
period and this seemed to increase the effectiveness of the patrol. 
4.  M-dogs or dogs similar to those of the 60th Infantry Platoon (Scout Dog) 
(Mine/Tunnel Detector Dog) can be successfully trained if trained by qualified trainers.  
The difficulty seems to be determining the qualifications necessary to adequately train 
dogs and handlers, especially when the military decision-makers lack any background or 
experience with dog training.  Alternatively, some who do have experience with dogs 
with certain capabilities may bring a particular bias to developing new capabilities. 
5.  Acquisition is a perennial problem.  The lack of foresight and resources 
applied to the acquisition issue continues to restrict US dog programs from their full 
potential to save American lives in conflicts.  The use of dogs in combat has continually 
been underestimated by the US military.  Consequently, since World War II the 
maintenance of an adequate pool of qualified dogs and the process to procure even 
greater numbers quickly has never been established.  Civilian contracting or other options 
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should be explored to determine whether decentralization of the procurement process can 
provide adequate numbers of qualified dogs.   
6.  The organization of the dog units as separate platoons attached to higher 
headquarters may help prevent elimination of the units after a conflict.  Since dog 
platoons or teams were not assigned to the tactical level of command, tactical 
commanders did not have ownership of the assets, and therefore after Vietnam many 
commanders did not object to platoons’ deactivation since it did not directly impact their 
own unit’s organization and equipment.  We should prevent the same from occurring 
again in the future. 
7.  Scout dogs were extremely effective in Vietnam.  This is based on an 
extensive literature review and personal testimonials of those individuals who operated 
with or as the scout dog teams.  As Jesse Mendez’s spreadsheet shows, scout dogs made 
many contributions at the tactical level.  The more people who can be saved on the 
battlefield, the more effectiveness and combat strength can be maintained by a unit.  The 
psychological advantage of feeling less vulnerable to the enemy also helped enhance 
patrol members’ effectiveness.   
8.  There are numerous lessons to be learned about military dog handling from the 
Vietnam programs.  The issue is that there is no centralized source of information on the 
subject or repository of materials.  The greatest sources of information and documents are 
found in veterans’ personal collections.  The DoD Military Working Dog Program at 
Lackland AFB does not have the various manuals or documents produced in the past.  At 
the very least, this material and lessons learned should be maintained at the DoD Military 
Working Dog Training Center so that current and future dog handlers can review the 
experiences of former handlers and ensure that past lessons are built on in order to save 
lives.  Too many lessons have had to be relearned at the expense of American lives.  The 
use of After Action Reviews such as those used in Vietnam could also well be of use 
during current operations in order to capture the lessons and ensure that the dog team 
training programs are producing dog teams that adequately fulfill the requirements of the 
current operational environments. 
9.  Civilian contracting of dog training, such as that done by BSI during Vietnam, 
may well be called for today, but the training must be properly executed by qualified 
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personnel.  Otherwise, the military risks contracting with trainers and program managers 
who offer a capability that is not realistic.  If dogs are to be trained by civilian contractors 
the military should release a list of requirements and desired capabilities.  If the 
contractor meets the demands, then the military may purchase the dog.  This would 
require military personnel who are independent from the contractors to evaluate the dogs, 
as well as to develop acceptable and measurable standards.  
    
53 
IV. CURRENT DOG PROGRAMS 
A. THE DOG PROGRAMS FROM VIETNAM TO TODAY 
To understand the current Military Working Dog (MWD) program requires some 
explanation of what happened after the US pulled out of Vietnam.  As Lemish comments, 
the US MWD programs ebb and flow, “with the close of one conflict or the start of a new 
one.  What is disturbing is that the lessons learned are not always carried to the next 
generation and the experiences of the past are often lost, only sometimes rediscovered, 
and all too often ignored” (Lemish, 1996, p. 243-244).  For instance, the military 
cancelled the scout, mine/tunnel, and tracker dog teams at the end of the Vietnam War, 
even though the programs demonstrated their effectiveness in Vietnam.   
The lessons regarding the effectiveness of patrol dogs started as an Air Force 
experiment in 1968 when the Air Force leadership recognized that sentry dogs were too 
aggressive to be used on patrol in law enforcement roles.  Four of the new patrol dogs 
were trained for the Air Force by the Metropolitan Police, Washington, DC (Kelch, 1982, 
p. 34).  The first patrol dog class began at Lackland Air Force Base in August 1969.  The 
patrol dog was not supposed to be a raging, snarling beast although on command it would 
become aggressive and attack.  It was used off-leash and in situations that were 
unsuitable for the use of sentry dogs, such as around crowds.  The patrol dog was a 
multipurpose dog, while the sentry dog was considered single purpose.  
“Beginning in 1971, the Air Force ‘discovered’ that dogs could be used to detect 
narcotics and explosives” (Lemish, p. 244).  The first narcotic dogs were used to search 
for marijuana on flights inbound from Vietnam to the United States.  The program was 
soon expanded to include a number of other narcotics.  Many techniques were used to get 
the narcotics past the dogs, but most failed and dogs proved to be highly reliable and 





The British in 1971 were using dogs effectively to detect explosives in Northern 
Ireland.  This quickly became important due to the increasing number of airline 
hijackings and threats.  Other federal agencies soon realized the capability that the dogs 
offered.8 
MWDs did not participate in Grenada (October 18, 1983).  A few were included 
in Panama in 1989, but participated only in the military police role.  The use of dogs in 
other roles was not considered.  Eighty dog teams were used in Desert Storm in 1991 
(Lemish, p. 248).  The dogs were used for narcotics and explosive detection and for 
security.9  According to Lemish, Carlo, a dual-purpose explosive-sniffing Belgian 
Malinois, was quite effective in Kuwait, “During their sixty-day tour together, Carlo 
alerted [his handler] to 167 caches of explosives, some rigged to explode on contact.  One 
booby trap consisted of a pack of cluster bombs hidden beneath a case of American MRE 
(Meals-Ready-to-Eat) containers” (Lemish, p. 248).   
“These dogs were never used under actual combat circumstances, but far away 
from the actual fighting and frequently in Kuwait after the Iraqi withdrawal” (Lemish, p. 
248).  FM 3-19.17 outlines the most recent contributions of MWDs:  
In the 1990s and early 2000s, MWDs were deployed around the globe in 
military operations such as Just Cause, Desert Shield and Desert Storm, 
Uphold Democracy, and Enduring Freedom and Iraqi Freedom.  These 
teams were effectively utilized to enhance the security of critical facilities 
and areas, as well as bolster force protection and antiterrorism missions, 
allowing commanders to use military police soldiers and other assets more 
effectively elsewhere….MWDs are force multipliers.  Installation 
commanders should include MWDs when planning for force protection 
and antiterrorism countermeasures….The various uses of MWDs have 
been effectively employed in many aspects of military police missions.  
MWDs are utilized effectively at gates, camps and bases, and checkpoints 
and for random searches for narcotics and explosive devices.  MWDs are 
also utilized for other missions in support of combat, combat support, and 
combat service support units (FM 3-19.17, p. 1-3).    
                                                 
8 By this time the terminology had changed somewhat and the military began to refer to its dogs 
simply as military working dogs (MWD) along with their specialty (patrol, patrol/explosive, or 
patrol/narcotic).  This terminology is still in use and is included in the current FM 3-19.17, Military 
Working Dogs, manual dated July 2005. 
9 This was the first deployment of Belgian Malinois in combat (Belgian Malinois had been previously 
adopted for use due to the reduced risk of hip dysplasia compared to the German Shepherds).   
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Worth noting is that according to FM 3-19.17, “PD [Patrol Dog] teams are 
effective on combat patrols and as listening posts and reconnaissance team members” 
(FM 3-19.17, p. 1-6).  However, Jesse Mendez and several other former Vietnam 
handlers are skeptical of the patrol dog teams’ capabilities in combat in these roles.  They 
are confident in their proven effectiveness as law enforcement tools, but to support 
combat units creates several potential difficulties.  This is based on the training that it 
took to prepare a scout dog team for Vietnam.  The aspects of the PD that concern them 
the most are the potential for barking during a patrol if a dog has not been specifically 
trained for silent alert, the degree to which controlled aggression may make the dog more 
difficult to control in contacts with the enemy, minimal scout training, and lack of 
realistic, simulated combat training.  Combat training, as far as many Vietnam Veterans 
are concerned, needs to incorporate the supported units and the firing of all potential 
weapons systems to desensitize the dog to the probable stimuli in a dynamic combat 
environment.   
This is not to say that MWDs have not proved effective in current operations. 
Examples of handlers and dogs working in Iraq with explosive detecting patrol MWDs 
are Marine Corporal Paldino teamed with Santo, a Czechoslovakian Shepherd, and 
Marine Corporal Cleveringa teamed with Rek, a German Shepherd.  They were two of 
fourteen Marine Dog teams in Iraq during 2004.  Their experiences were captured in an 
article in Solder of Fortune magazine in May 2005.  As the article describes, “When the 
enemy went underground after major hostilities ended in May 2003, they hid their 
weapons and explosives in buildings and beneath the surface of the ground.”  The article 
goes on to note, “It didn’t take the Marine Corps long to determine that dogs with highly 
skilled handlers were needed to locate the hidden caches of weapons and explosives 
being used with deadly effect against coalition forces” (p. 42).  For instance, the dogs 
were able to detect a weapons cache that was buried one foot below the surface of the 
ground. (Cooper, 2005, p. 46). 
The handlers both remember the 147 degree heat during the day, making the 
conditions extremely dangerous for the dogs.  They said that dogs could not accompany 
the Marines on 12 hour patrols due to the canines’ sensitivity to extreme heat.   
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According to Cooper’s article, CPL Paldino, “says he and the other dog handlers 
had a ‘general idea’ of what they were getting into before they deployed to Iraq, but they 
didn’t know exactly what to expect until they came under fire for the first time” (p. 43).  
They initially came under fire while searching an apartment complex. Their battalion 
commander also wanted the dog teams to sweep the future sites for his Command 
Operations Center.  In describing the sweeps, Paldino and Cleveringa admitted, “It was 
kind of scary because everybody else was stepping back and we were stepping forward” 
(p. 43).  The two teams searched the outside perimeters of the building before entering 
and then went room to room searching for booby traps or trip wires.  Their dogs never 
found any devices during their searches.  On one occasion, their dogs alerted to a blue 
van and the patrol was ambushed by an enemy with automatic weapons.  Discussing 
some of the other challenges and dangers facing handlers and dogs in Iraq, Paldino 
comments, “Under no circumstances does a handler unleash his dog.  It’s too dangerous 
during a firefight.  Too much lead flying around.  My dog could be killed by friendly fire 
just as easily as he could be by enemy fire” (Cooper, 2005, p. 43).  Paldino’s comments 
also raises possible concerns for the current “off-leash” dog handling programs, such as 
the Specialized Search Dog (SSD) programs (described below).  
The handlers also commented that they experienced little sleep due to mortar or 
rocket fire and that they could see Marine artillery and aircraft firing on insurgents in 
Falluja.  Paldino and Cleveringa stated that their dogs, “would spring to their feet and 
bark when something went “BANG” during the night, but as time wore on, they’d just 
open their eyes and go back to sleep next to their handlers” (pp. 44-45). 
“The US Army has some 30 dogs in Iraq, guarding bases and checking cars for 
explosives.  Zalwski [a Staff Sergeant and Army Kennel Master in Iraq] says the dogs 
have uncovered car bombs and have such sensitive noses that one was able to smell an 
ammunition clip in a woman’s pocketbook (Meixler, 2004, p.1).  According to R. 
Norman Moody, “An estimated 400 dog-and-handler teams are serving currently in 
Southwest Asia, including about 250 in the war in Iraq.  The Department of Defense has 
about 1,800 military working dogs in all” (Moody, 2005, p.1). 
According to Staff Sergeant Ann Pitt, a US Army dog handler based near Nasiriya 
in Iraq, “We have many items to help us do our mission, but I don’t think we have a 
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better detection tool than a dog….These dogs are amazing.  They are more dependable 
and effective than almost anything we have available to us” (Lacey, 2005).  Pitt describes 
the dog’s olfactory sense in these terms, “…dogs have 25 times more smell receptors 
than humans….We smell spaghetti sauce and we think ‘Oh, the spaghetti sauce smells 
good’….To a dog, they would smell the tomatoes, the onions, the basil, and oregano.  
They smell all the odors individually” (Lacey, 2005). 
The majority of canines in recent combat operations have been patrol dogs.  Most 
have been dogs trained at Lackland AFB.  However, some unit commanders, just as in 
Korea, have bought dogs on their own from civilian contractors.  According to Robert 
Dameworth, the current DoD MWD Program Manager, the best estimates were that until 
recently there were 65 contractor dogs being used by US forces in Iraq and Afghanistan.  
This practice of using contractor dogs has since been eliminated.  The reasons for not 
allowing the use of the contractor dogs are numerous, ranging from the lack of 
standardization and certification to the lack of proven effectiveness that may place US 
soldiers’ lives at increased risk.  The debate over contractor or military-trained dogs 
seems to be a problem that haunts the history of the dog program.   
B. CURRENT PROGRAMS   
The Department of Defense (DoD) MWD program is managed from Lackland Air 
Force Base near San Antonio, TX.  The current DoD MWD program manager is Robert 
Dameworth, a former Air Force Dog Handler with extensive Vietnam experience.  His 
responsibilities include the proper training and implementation of all military working 
dogs in the Department of Defense.  Mr. Dameworth chairs a committee called the Joint 
MWD Committee, which has the basic charter of reviewing and setting DoD policy for 
anything that includes dogs.  The committee also meets to discuss the training program at 
Lackland AFB and other training centers.   
Directive 5200.31 (7 September 1983) designates: 
The Air Force as the single manager for the Services’ Military Working 
Dog Program.  This directive also designated the DOD Dog Training 
Center as the primary training facility for MWDs. 
The Air Force designated the Office of Security Police (AFOSP) as its 
Service proponency office.  Similarly, proponency for MWDs was 
established by the other Services within their law enforcement channels.  
58 
This program alignment has had a major limiting effect on the overall 
MWD program in terms of its application to military operations outside 
the traditional law enforcement area (Thornton, p. 7). 
FM 3-19.17 states that the, “MWDs are a unique item; they are the only living 
item in the Army supply system.  Like other highly specialized equipment, MWDs 
complement and enhance the capabilities of the military police. MWD teams enable the 
military police to perform its mission more effectively and with significant savings of 
manpower, time, and money” (p. 1-2).   
The realization that a dog team is a DoD asset and not a Service asset is the key to 
better understanding current DoD dog programs.  The best explanation of the role of Mr. 
Dameworth and the program is one given by CPT John Larson, who is the US Army 
exchange officer, Concepts and Doctrine Branch, and the commander of D Company, 
701st Military Police Battalion.  CPT Larson was also a former dog handler during his 
enlisted time in the Army.  According to CPT Larson, 
It is his [Mr Dameworth’s] job to fill DoD requirements.  When an RFF 
[Request for Forces] comes in he fills it first with service specific forces in 
the AO [Area of Operations] and then fills any shortfalls with sister 
services.  Two examples: (1) When SOF [Special Operations Forces] 
requests MWD support in Afghanistan, he fills it with Army and Marine 
MWD Handlers.  The Navy Handlers are not trained or equipped for those 
type of missions. (2) The Explosive Detector Dog Teams (EDDT) are 
always on standby for the POTUS [President of the US] missions.  They 
are required to have civilian dress clothes and a passport.  When the 
President moves, a tasking comes down to Bob who tasks out the nearest 
geographical EDDT who then work with the Secret Service until mission 
complete. 
One more example:  The United Nations General Assembly just met in 
New York.  The State Department requirement for support involved over 
55 dog teams and a Kennel Master.  Bob put that together with teams from 
all four services.   
The MWDs have never been solely a Military Police [MP] Mission, but 
you can see how that is the most appropriate Branch to have Executive 
Agency over them.  MPs cover 5 Battlefield Functions, and the Handlers 
can perform in all five (Area Security, Movement and Mobility Ops, 
EPW, Law and Order, and Police Intelligence Operations).  Plus the tie to 
Law Enforcement, working with the Secret Service, Homeland Security, 
US Border Patrol, and other Government Agencies.  It is this State 
Department work that helps us justify the expense of the [dog] program.  
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If it was not for these requirements, the Army would have dropped the 
MWD program a long time ago!  I truly feel the Infantry will have a hard 
time justifying a MWD program of their own.  Even with these missions, 
we can not justify single purpose trained dog teams, hence the dual teams.  
A true test will be to watch the Engineer’s program [to be discussed later 
in this chapter] (Email from CPT John Larson on October 12, 2005). 
One of the key concerns that some have in respect to the DoD dog program is the 
fact that the teams become a DoD asset.  This means that a dog and handler may not be 
available locally if the asset has been assigned to other units or another Service.  This 
limits the number of people that some units are willing to send in order to receive training 
with K-9s.  For instance, the 75th Ranger Regiment was interested in possibly training 
some of its soldiers at the Lackland AFB training center.  But their interest subsided 
when they discovered that their personnel, once trained can be tasked by Mr. Dameworth, 
the DoD MWD Program Manager. This concern over losing assets or not being able to 
control their availability seems to be another impetus for some commanders turning to 
civilian contractors to procure trained dogs.   
The other aspect of the military working dog program at Lackland is the 341st 
Training Squadron.  The 341st has the mission to provide: 
trained military working dogs (MWDs) used in patrol, drug and explosive 
detection and specialized mission functions for the Department of Defense 
(DoD), other government agencies and allies.  Conducts operational 
training of MWD handlers and supervisors.  Sustains DoD MWD program 
through logistical support, veterinary care, and research and development 
for security efforts worldwide (Briefing provided by LTC Bannister, 









Figure 6.   Organization of the 341st Training Squadron 
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The 341st consists of a command section and three ‘flights’: Training Support, Logistics, 
and Operations. The flights consist of selected personnel for all four branches of Service, 
Department of the Air Force civilians, and civilian contractors.  The Operations Flight is 
responsible for the MWD Handler Course, MWD Kennel Master Course, MWD Course 
and, as of April 4th, 2005, the Specialized Search Dog (SSD) Course.  The Training 
Support Flight provides support for three critical functions. 
1. Training Management – is responsible for: 
a) Implementation of ITRO Course procedures. 
b) Development of training plans. 
c) Scheduling courses.  
d) Managing course allocation requirements. 
e) Creating AETC course control documents. 
f) Developing all MWD course curriculums. 
2.  Resource Management – is responsible for: 
a) Managing budget/supply accounts: 
1) $600K in O&M. 
2) $2.6M Kennel Contract. 
3) $1.7M MWD Procurement. 
4) $2.3M SSD. 
b) Training areas, facilities, and vehicles 
1) 98 training areas. 
2) 70 facilities. 
3) 36 vehicles and 61trailers. 
3.  Evaluations Section – is responsible for: 
a) MWD Evaluations. 
b) Certifications. 
c) MWD Feedback Program. 
d) Squadron Self-inspection.  
(Briefing provided by LTC Bannister, commander of the 341st Training Squadron, 
on September 7, 2005). 
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The Logistics Flight is responsible for the procurement, kenneling, and 
distribution of all dogs entering the program.  It also tracks each dog’s status for the 
remainder of its service life. Essentially, logistics tracks MWDs from “Cradle to Grave.”  
As in the past, procurement continues to be a problem for the DoD Dog Program.  There 
is a continuing debate about where the sources for the DoD MWDs are located, since the 
program buys so many of its dogs from European breeders (Christenson, 1999).  
Also associated with the squadron are the US Army Veterinary Services and the 
TSA’s Explosives Detection Canine Team Program. The training squadron comprises the 
world’s largest dog school, consisting of 21 facilities plus six borrowed from other 
Lackland AFB organizations, over 900 kennel runs, and 400 acres of outdoor training 
areas (Briefing by LTC Bannister, commander of the 341st Training Squadron, on 
September 7, 2005). 
The following figures illustrate the scale and numbers of handlers and trained 
dogs that the MWD program produces each year.  The large amounts contribute to the 
challenges facing the MWD program.  As the first Figure, MWD Handler Production, 
indicates, demand for handlers has been increasing.  So have the requirement for trained 











Figure 7.   MWD Handler Production (Briefing by LTC Bannister the commander of 
































Figure 8.   Trained Dog Requirements (TDR) (Briefing by LTC Bannister the 
commander of the 341st Training Squadron, on September 7, 2005). 
 
The 341st Training Squadron conducts the 55-day long, DoD MWD Handler 
Course, which is divided into two blocks of instruction.  The blocks of instruction 
primarily cover the proper utilization of MWDs, installation protection, ground combat 
operations, presidential security, and anti-drug missions.  The first block, which focuses 
on patrolling, is approximately six weeks long, followed by more specific training in 
narcotic or explosive detection training.   
“The DoD MWD Trainer/Supervisor Course provides kennel masters and trainers 
with the skills to enhance their MWD program.  The course includes instruction in kennel 
management, administration, dog team training, and contemporary employment 
concepts” (Briefing by LTC Bannister the commander of the 341st Training Squadron, on 
September 7, 2005). 
The DoD MWD Course [which produces the trained dogs] provides both 
patrol and dual certified patrol/detector dogs [Cost is about $50,000 per 
trained dog.]  The course is 120-days long.  The dogs are trained in either 
drug or explosive detection.  The dogs are trained to detect marijuana, 
hashish, heroin, and cocaine and must meet a 90 percent accuracy standard 
to certify.  Explosive detector dogs are trained to detect seven explosive 
substances (smokeless powder, nitro dynamite, ammonia dynamite, TNT, 
C-4, water gel, and det cord) and two chemical compounds (sodium and 
potassium chlorate) and must meet a strict 95 percent standard (briefing by 


















The 341st Training Squadron is also conducting a new course recently added to 
the training program:  the Specialized Search Dog (SSD), implemented on 4 April 2005.  
The purpose of this program is to detect IEDs in an attempt to save lives.  The intent is to 
develop a dog team that can work off-leash to 300 meters in dynamic environments.  The 
off-leash capability is required for the protection of the handler in the event that the 
detected device can be remotely detonated.  The loss would then be only of the dog.  The 
off-leash aspect of the SSD program is the most challenging capability to develop, but is 
critical in an urban environment given the current IED threat.  Urban environments create 
a dynamic and potentially unfamiliar set of conditions that can distract or confuse the dog 
as to the proper response.  The more complex the environment, the more training is 
required to condition the dog and handler to know how to respond appropriately in 
particular situations, while the specific level of training required will be dependent on the 
individual dog and handler.    
The Air Force, Army, and Marine Corps each expressed a need for the program 
and funding was allocated by the Joint IED Defeat Task Force (Appendix D contains the 
memo authorizing each Service its funding for each satellite test program). The course is 
attempting to train dogs and handlers to operate off-leash and may incorporate a variety 
of technologies to enhance the teams’ capabilities.  The Air Force course is 93 days long 
and taught at Lackland AFB and the Yuma Proving Grounds.  Currently, the dog and 
handler are trained as a team and should deploy as a team.  The dogs are trained only to 









Figure 9.   The forecasted TDR for SSD and Mine Detector dogs for DoD and TSA. 
(Briefing by LTC Bannister the commander of the 341st Training Squadron, on 





















“In the fall of 2002, the US Army requested the 341st TRS develop a mine dog 
detection course.  To date the course resource estimate has been completed and we are 
awaiting US Army approval.  Expected start date FY 06” (Briefing by LTC Bannister the 
commander of the 341st Training Squadron, on September 7, 2005).   
Through the US Army Engineer School (USAES) at Fort Leonard Wood, the 
Army began its SSD program in October 2004.  The DoD MWD program manager 
authorized the Department of the Army (DA) to conduct three SSD pilot courses as a 
bridge to the DoD SSD program with the contract ending in March 2006.  On the Army’s 
staff for this program are subject matter experts from Great Britain and Canada who have 
expertise that is directly related to the SSD program and its requirements.  The instructors 
at Fort Leonard Wood from Concurrent Technologies Corporation (CTC) have over 50 
years of experience.  The program manager for the USAES SSD program is James Pettit, 
a former Ohio policeman, dog handler, and Army National Guard Engineer.  The 
program is under the direction of the Fort Leonard Wood’s Counter Explosives Hazards 
Center.  The Leonard Wood SSD program also includes personnel who have already 
deployed to the combat theaters and have captured many lessons learned that the program 
manager has incorporated into the training.  According to Ron Mistafa of Calgary-based 
Detector Dog Services International Ltd., a contracted instructor for the USAES SSD 
program, “Recognizing the value of trained dogs in combat zones rife with mines and 
booby traps, armies worldwide are scrambling to enlist more of them.  There are not 
enough handlers or instructors….There are probably 28 different explosive scents” 
(Slobodin, 2005, p. B3).  The teams have 48 total months of experience and the Leonard 
Wood program is the only one to date that has published any written doctrine for SSD 
operations.   
The USAES first set up a MWD program in 2001 with the purpose of producing 
Engineer Mine dogs.  The 30-team Engineer Mine dog detachment was created to search 
for mines in combat theaters.  The program is an enhanced version of the M-dog program 
set up by the Army in WWII.  USAES and Engineer personnel from the combat theaters 
in Iraq and Afghanistan have estimated that they require a ratio of one SSD to two Mine 
dogs to support operations in theater (telephone interview on September 28, 2005 with 
Mr. Jim Pettite, the program manager for the USAES SSD Program).   
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C. IMPROVEMENTS AND ONGOING CONCERNS 
The current programs have operated in a similar manner for a many years.  Even 
though, the MWD program has been viewed as being very successful, there are areas of 
improvement that have been identified by individuals working within the program.  One 
example of the numerous suggestions that have been made to improve the program is 
demonstrated by a memorandum written on April 2003 by CPT Rick Heidorn, the 
commander of D Company, 701st MP Battalion which represents the Army personnel in 
the Lackland AFB MWD program.  He states, “Shortcomings in training standardization 
and organizational support challenge the program [US Army Military Working Dog 
Program] to maintain high standards.”  The current commander of D Company indicated 
that most of the issues identified by CPT Heidorn still exist in the program. Heidorn’s 
concerns may be an indication of why some handlers seem to think that each Service 
should have its own programs.  The development of the SSD programs seems to support 
the fact that each Service has its own considerations and requirements of dog programs. 
One of Heidorn’s recommendations was to, “capture and consolidate valuable 
doctrine form MACOM [Major Commands] SOPs…and to develop an Army MWD 
Soldier Training Plan (STP).”  From Heidorn’s perspective, “the consolidation and 
publication of the proven best practices will advocate standardization.  Enforcements of a 
single set of certification standards will enable high quality collective training and 
performance.”  This recommendation identified the need to develop a standardized 
training plan that handlers and kennel masters can use, incorporating lessons learned 
from ongoing operations.  Basically, he advocates a centralized repository for 
information that can be accessed by all handlers and kennel masters to facilitate training 
and lessons learned to develop plans for deployment. 
Another issue identified by Heidorn has to do with who owns the dog teams after 
training.  The US Army Military Police School, USAMPS, establishes the training and 
certification for all Army MP assets, except for Army MWDs.  This means that the 
training and certification is not Service-specific, meaning that the dogs are not tailored 
for specific Army needs that may be different for other Services’ needs, even though 
training is the responsibility of the MACOM Kennel Masters.  Heidorn recommended 
that an Army MWD Program Quality Assurance Team be formed to, “provide quality 
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control and standardization of MACOM certification authorities.  This team would be 
able to conduct inspections, training assistance visits, and have the ability to form and 
execute Mobile Training Teams to update the field with the most current training 
techniques, record keeping, and preventive veterinarian medicine.”  The result would be, 
“Army MWD teams that are universally trained to one standard, ensuring increased 
operational responsiveness and effectiveness.” 
Heidorn contradicts himself in the area of the need for standardization when he 
later argues in his memorandum, “All Army MWDs train to the same standards, each 
MACOM and subordinate kennels have variable quality and quantities of training 
equipment and facilities.”  He recommends that the Lackland program, “query each 
MACOM to produce a list of required training and mission essential equipment.”  Since 
the units have the lessons learned from the combat theaters, these lessons if properly 
consolidated and reviewed would provide a list of items that should be standard 
equipment for each MACOM.  The MWD program could then facilitate research into 
these items and decide what to make available to the teams.  This lack of equipment 
seems to be another example of history repeating itself, given the shortages of equipment 
for the dog units in Korea.  Heidorn points out that the standardized common table of 
allowances would, “enable a seamless transition of MWD teams from one-duty location 
to another.” 
 Heidorn also implies that the DoD MWD Program does not provide the complete 
education required by Kennel Masters in the Army.  “The DoD course does not cover 
Army specific task needed to lead an Army kennel.”  He recommends an additional 
course be developed to augment the current DoD courses in order to, “provide timely and 
accurate Army specific training to the field.”  Heidorn also touches on the issue of career 
progression in the Army Military Police career field.  The current method of career 
progression requires Non-commissioned Officers (NCO) pass through a number of 
leadership positions in order to be considered for senior ranks.  Since the dog handler job 
does not receive the same consideration for promotion as that of a platoon sergeant, many 
experienced dog handlers must leave the dogs and work within other Military Police 
functions.  There are very few senior NCO positions available.  This means that much of 
the experience has to move on in order to be promoted and is not immediately available 
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to the MWD program.  If the dog program positions were viewed differently then the 
program could benefit from the retention of its “best” people and technical expertise. 
D. CONCLUSIONS 
1.  The current MWD program is heavily biased to the use of dogs in the law 
enforcement role.  This can be attributed to their long standing use and training by the 
military police and security forces personnel.  The lack of tactical units at Lackland AFB 
may further hinder the exploration of expanding the use of dogs in current operations.  
Another factor that may influence the program is “institutional inertia”.  The Lackland 
program has been operational and resourced for many years and has been viewed as a 
successful program when producing “patrol dogs.”  Since the program has been 
successful some may desire to keep it on the same course instead of assuming the risk of 
change.  As John Spivey, the First Sergeant of D Company, 701st Military Police 
Battalion at Lackland AFB (which is the highest ASI Z6 coded (dog handler) enlisted 
position in the Army) puts it, “If the AF does not lose its ‘COP’ mentality and begin to 
train the teams as war fighters, the Army and USMC will be forced to develop their own 
training in order to remain relevant” (emailed questionnaire response from 1SG Spivey, 
dated October 12, 2005).  
A dog that works for the military police may not be the “best fit” for an infantry 
patrol in a combat environment.  This issue was addressed during Vietnam by training 
personnel who conducted the patrols as the handlers.  The Infantry already possess 
equipment and training that are specific to their role as Infantrymen; the dogs used on 
their patrols may also need the same level of Infantry specific training.  According to 
many Vietnam-era handlers, to be effective handlers need a background and training 
similar to that of the supported unit in order to integrate effectively with the supported 
unit.  This problem correlates directly back to WWII when the patrol leaders were biased 
against the Quartermaster handlers due to their lack of Infantry training. 
2.  There are risks involved with housing the DoD program at Lackland AFB.  
One is that the focus is on the needs of the Air Force since the majority of the facilities 
and training environment belongs to the Air Force.  Another problem is the potential for 
“Group Think.”  The danger for the DoD program is that the instructors, trainers, and  
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handlers are all from the same program.  An independent study or review of the DoD 
program may be necessary to periodically assess whether or not “Group Think” has taken 
hold and/or is affecting the program. 
3.  The SSD programs were started as satellite programs in the Army and Air 
Force.  (The Marine Corps embarked on a number of test programs to determine the 
dogs’ best utilization; however, the information on the Marine Corps dog programs is 
limited.)  As mentioned earlier, the Army’s program is staffed by subject matter experts 
from Great Britain and Canada.  
As a consequence, the Leonard Wood program is incorporating many of the 
techniques used by the British that were validated in Northern Ireland.  The Lackland 
program, in contrast, seems to be an extension of the explosive detection program that is 
already used with the patrol dogs--the extension meaning an ability to work off-leash to 
detect explosives.  Also, the Air Force SSD program is currently using the standard seven 
scent training aid kit, whereas the program at Fort Leonard Wood is attempting to 
incorporate devices that are being encountered in theater.   
One concern raised during my observations at Lackland occurred when I asked 
the Air Force’s SSD program manager (PM), a recently retired NCO from the 341st 
Training Squadron, if the training at Yuma used IEDs similar to those found in Iraq.  I 
received an answer that surprised me.  The PM stated that while the Yuma training 
facility staff were willing to build car bombs and devices exactly like those found in Iraq, 
he had told the Yuma personnel to just put the explosives in the car trunks.  The PM also 
said that Yuma would “daisy chain” artillery rounds together, to mimic those found in 
Iraq, but that he didn’t feel it was necessary that they be that realistic since the dog didn’t 
alert to those aspects of the devices.  This seems quite contrary to the principles of 
training used by the Scout Dog program for Vietnam, when the aim was to replicate 
conditions as exactly as possible since no human can ever be exactly sure what cues the 
dogs might pick up on.  
If there are as many as 28 different explosive scents dogs should alert to, then the 
current explosive scent kit used at Lackland AFB may not be adequate.  To ensure that 
the current training is adequate and accurately reflects the threat, periodic reviews should 
be done of procedures and training aids.  Any discrepancies between the nature of the 
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threat and the actual training can then be addressed.  Ideally, this would lead to more 
realistic training such as that used in the earlier Scout Dog program that reflected such a 
high degree of success. 
Also, the dogs the Air Force program uses are from the DoD dog procurement 
process.  The SSD program at Lackland AFB does receive the “pick” of dogs from the 
kennels at Lackland; but these are dogs originally procured for patrol work.  This means 
that by the time Lackland acquires the dogs, at around one year of age, they may have 
already received some training from the breeders in Germany.  The breeders know the 
criteria that the procurement program personnel use and prepare the dogs for the tests.  
This means that some dogs have more or less training than others.   
Historically, aggressive dogs or dogs that have the attributes to attack or patrol 
seem to work less effectively off-leash than on leash.  This is based on testimony from 
Jesse Mendez and other handlers.  The off-leash dogs need to exhibit more self-control 
and be more subdued.  This problem goes back to the procurement problems of the past:  
how to find adequate numbers of qualified dogs and then effectively and efficiently 
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V. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
A.  QUESTIONNAIRE BACKGROUND 
Over the course of my research, through extensive conversations, correspondence, 
emails, and site visits, I developed a 39 question survey (Appendix E) which was then 
disseminated via the US War Dog Association and Jesse Mendez.  Former and current 
handlers responded with pages of answers.  This is the only attempt I am aware of to 
capture the perceptions of the most knowledgeable and experienced individuals in the art 
of handling dogs in combat or in the military.  Not all of the responses were from 
handlers who had been to combat with their dogs, but the insights of non-combat 
handlers proved no less valuable.  The expertise of these individuals cannot be overstated 
and their interest in furthering the use of dogs in the military to save US lives is inspiring, 
to say the least. 
The questionnaire reflected a number of the issues that surfaced during 
conversations, numerous emails, my research, and observations at Lackland AFB.  While 
the questions are not “all inclusive” of the issues I discovered, I believe these should 
provide a baseline of information that may spur further research, exploration, and 
investigation.  The issues that most people regarded as important revolved around 
training—and the need for realistic, scenario-based training—the eternal problem of 
procurement, and the potential need for each Service to develop a specific dog training 
program that can fulfill each Service’s independent requirements.   
Most handlers maintain that dogs should be used as defensive mechanisms and 
are essential in Iraq.  As one former sentry dog handler from Vietnam, Kiernan Holliday 
emailed, “I believe that the soldiers in Iraq are in a much more dangerous situation than 
we were in Vietnam.” 
The majority of the concerns expressed by former handlers focused on the 
training of the dogs and handlers.  Specifically, the respondents were most concerned 
about whether the training of the handlers was adequate for the combat role.  The 
handler, they suggested, seems to be the member of the team whose performance is the  
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most questionable.  The handler has to develop a keen ability to read his individual dog.  
The sustainment of the dog teams’ effectiveness before, during, and after operations is 
also a major concern.   
A total of 26 responses were received by me as of October 16, 2005.10  The 
demographic composition of these respondents is: 1 – Korean War Handler, 13 – 
Vietnam War Handlers, 10 -- Current Handlers, Current Program Managers, Kennel 
Masters, and Trainer/Instructors, and 2 – “Others” category.  In addition, I also received 
numerous emails with individual comments referring to several questions, though these 
individuals did not complete the entire questionnaire.  Of the respondents, 17 had seen 
combat as dog handlers in at least one theater.  Only one person responded with a 
negative perception about the dogs’ capabilities.  He was a former sentry dog handler and 
on two occasions the dog alerted and, according to him, could have led to “friendly fire” 
incidents that could have killed Americans. 
What follows is a summary of the concerns addressed and raised in response to 
the questionnaire. 
B. PROCUREMENT 
Procurement is a perennial issue.  Especially contentious are what breeds and 
breeders to use, and whether dogs should be single of dual purpose.  This raises the 
question of what the dogs are being procured for.  John Spivey, First Sergeant of D 
Company, 701st Military Police Battalion at Lackland AFB, describes the issue in these 
terms:  
…the DoD needs to widen its vendor base and look at other vendors, 
particularly in the US. The personnel they have selecting dogs for training 
must realize that we are looking for War Dogs and not police K-9s.  The 
dogs we are procuring are too small in most cases and do not have strong 
enough drive.” (questionnaire response, October 12, 2005)   
Worse is the perception, deserved or not, that, “the Air Force screens and keeps 
the best dogs for themselves; they recently sold a BLIND dog to the Army that had 
already been rejected by the Mine dog school” (Michael Landers, a former handler, 
September 29, 2005).  The issue according to Bill Riley, a former handler, is that, “In the 
                                                 
10 I cannot say with how many people received the questionnaires, as they were distributed through the 
internet and the US War Dog Website. 
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past poor quality, civilian rejected dogs were successfully trained for sentry work, but 
more complex higher demanding functions required better dogs” (questionnaire response, 
October 7, 2005). 
There is a continual debate about dual versus single purpose dogs.  According to 
Captain Haggerty, a former handler, “Dual purpose dogs are a mistake.  The Scout Dog is 
the exception, but they are not ‘dual purpose’ but rather also detect mines, punji pit, trip 
wires.  If you were trapped in a mine field and a dog was assigned to get you out would 
you rather the dog be a mine and patrol dog or a full-time mine dog?” 
According to Mike Lister, a former handler:  
Patrol Dogs are dual purpose if they are also trained in explosive detection 
or drug detection, and they do both well.  I am sure you could also train a 
Patrol Dog to be a Scout Dog, or possibly a mine dog.  When training the 
Super Dogs at Ft. Benning on scouting, mine detection, and tracking, there 
were some problems.  [We] Thought the dogs could perform all three 
functions, they were not as proficient as the specialized dog.  This was 
especially true when teaching the scout or mine dog to track, because they 
were trained to keep their heads up for airborne scent, and vice versa for 
tracker dogs.  Could one dog be trained to be a scout dog and mine dog, 
yes it is possible, but my experience says their proficiency would drop. 
(questionnaire response, September 29, 2005) 
If the dog is expected to perform a particular task flawlessly, then a single 
purpose dog may be the best option.  The dual purpose dog provides an increased 
capability with fewer numbers, since a dog can perform two roles: patrolling and 
drug/narcotics detection, for instance.   
An issue subsidiary to procurement is what to do with dog teams once the service-
member receives orders to leave the theater.  Current and former handlers alike believe 
that dogs and handlers should rotate together.  This is primarily due to the “bond” that 
develops between the dog and the handler that makes them a team.  Some handlers who 
operated in Vietnam do admit that the dogs could stay and work with new handlers, as 
they did there.  That way the dog is familiar and adjusted to the environment.  As one 
individual remarked, “I think a dog that has adapted to the theater gives the new handler a 
better chance of coming home alive.  Mine taught me all he knew.”  Others are concerned 
that dogs need time away from combat, just as people do, in order to remain effective. 
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Or, as Kiernan Holliday, a former handler put it: 
The answer to this question is governed by emotions.  It makes no 
difference what arguments you marshal on either side, the answer is 
always going to be based on your belief about dogs and people.  If you 
believe that dogs should stay with handlers because they form a “bond,” 
then the answer is yes.  Dogs aren’t people, they’re dogs.  We changed 
handlers on the dogs in Vietnam every year, and it worked fine.  If you 
have a good dog who works well in combat, why bring it back to the 
States?  If the answer is to satisfy a “bond” between the handler and the 
dog, then you’re back to emotions. (questionnaire response, September 11, 
2005) 
Jim Pettit, the SSD program manager for the US Army Engineer Center, voices 
concerns over not only procurement of the dogs, but also about handlers: 
 Great care must be taken in the selection of personnel for training as a 
dog handler.  A trained dog expertly handled will pay untold dividends, 
whereas a badly handled one might easily become a liability.  Potential 
handlers must be chosen from volunteers who possess a natural 
understanding of and sympathy with dogs.  Reliability is another essential 
characteristic of the potential handler; a person must be capable of 
performing without strict supervision what he/she has been taught during 
training. (questionnaire response, October 11, 2005) 
Overall, it seems the current procurement process is working adequately.  
Whether the system can accommodate larger numbers if needed is questionable, as it 
always has been in the past. 
C. TRAINING 
Beyond selection and procurement is training.  Gregory Blaylock’s response to 
the questionnaire, on October 18, 2005, in reference to training was:  
I tell each graduating class I get to speak to that, as a dog handler, I kept 
looking for that one ‘expert’ trainer or kennel master, or that next 
course/class that would teach me everything I need to know…it doesn’t 
exist.  We must always seek to improve.  The enemy studies our Tactics, 
Techniques and Procedures, just as we study theirs.  And they change 
accordingly.  Getting things changed from the operational world to the 
training world seems to be a particular challenge.  Formal course changes 
involve reviews and validations and many other ‘procedures.’  We need a 
more real-time method of adapting to changes in theater tactics/needs.  
Keep in mind, however, except for SSD we train dog and handler 
separately – only to an apprentice level.  I believe we share the 
responsibility to make needed improvements with the entire MWD world.  
What makes MWD teams effective is just that…TEAM.  The dogs and 
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new handlers we train should be paired at the gaining base and trained, 
trained, trained.  There should always be Regional Training Centers to 
provide “Just In Time” training for those bound for specific theaters of 
operation. (questionnaire response, October 18, 2005) 
Such statements are echoed over and over.  Or, as John Burnam puts it:  
I can only suggest that the course for any type of training be mocked-up to 
mirror a realistic scenario one would expect to encounter during a live 
mission.  That scenario should be constantly tested for its reliability and 
preparedness of the dog team, and its application to beat the current needs 
of the missions being assigned.  The course material and mock-ups should 
evolve and be managed with the current lessons learned provided from the 
field in the practical combat situations now being encountered. 
(questionnaire response, September 30, 2005) 
Other suggestions for enhancing training include:  running test scenarios with old 
versus new training methods to compare them; a required stint at the National Training 
Center (NTC) or another training center; and a train the trainer course for troubleshooting 
problems. 
Another point of concern is that current handlers have almost no experience 
training with infantry.  This is of concern since the dog generally has to be desensitized to 
new conditions so that the handler learns to read the dog’s reactions.  If the dog team has 
not been trained with an infantry unit and then has to operate with one on a deployment, 
the handler may discover that the dog may need more training in order to be effective, yet 
the time required for re-training is not likely to be available.  One reason this is important 
is that, as Burnam points out, “I learned in Vietnam that once my dog alerted on the 
enemy, I was nothing more than an infantryman in combat and survival depended on 
other skills” (questionnaire response, September 30, 2005). 
Most current handlers have never conducted long marches with their dogs.  One 
exception is Spivey, who saw combat in Panama.  Another individual responded that he 
marches with his dog monthly on his own initiative.  Currently, there seem to be no 
requirements regarding physical conditioning of the canine member of the dog team.  
This issue is one that seems to merit further attention. 
As Bill Riley explains: 
 As an instructor we force marched the training dog platoons on a regular 
basis.  They needed to be ready for the hot humid climate of Viet Nam.  
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Handlers were taught how to identify and treat K-9 heat exhaustion or 
prostration.  A dog team that is not properly conditioned becomes a 
hazard.  If the dog doesn’t have stamina it will become tired and lose 
interest.  He may start to slack off and stop picking up scent.  Walking 
point or being on guard requires a full attention. (questionnaire response, 
October 7, 2005) 
Whereas most former handlers were trained on all methods of transportation and 
deployment, helicopters, military vehicles, rappelling, waterborne, current handlers are 
not receiving formal training in all transportation methods.  The implication is there is no 
set standard, and that training varies from kennel to kennel. 
One of the points that must be reiterated is that training must be ongoing and 
continuous.  Burnam emphasizes training, but also the responsibility of the handler: 
 There is always that little fear factor of ‘Am I prepared for life and death 
situations in combat?’  You hope you are prepared and training pays off.  
But you’re never sure until you get in the field and put your dog to work 
on point.  In Vietnam, no one ensured I was prepared.  It was not an item 
on a checklist that was checked off by the dog platoon leader before I 
walked out the gate to go on a mission.  I was just expected to be ready for 
a mission when called upon.  Therefore, it was up to me to be prepared. 
(questionnaire response, September 30, 2005) 
Unfortunately, as one anonymous respondent points out, “I stand behind my 
belief that nothing prepares you for the real thing.  I do believe I was adequately trained 
to be trained some more, whether by real-world personal experience or simulation” 
(questionnaire response, September 30, 2005). 
Theodore McCall III explains that all contexts or environments are important:  
Dogs will be most proficient if trained in the environment that they will 
work in, you can’t train a dog in too many environments, but unfamiliar 
environments can seriously affect the dogs understanding of what is 
expected of it.  For example, take a dog and teach it to jump a standard 
obedience hurdle, once it has mastered it and you know the dog will 
perform on command, take the dog to a fence that it can see through, that 
is the same height, and give the command to jump.  99% of the time the 
dog will not understand what it is expected to do.  However, if you teach 
the dog to jump a hurdle, wall, bush, rope, etc., and then bring it to a fence 
the very first time, the dog will most likely jump the fence without 
hesitation. (questionnaire response, October 14, 2005) 
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In other words, begin with a baseline and add variation to it.  This even applies to 
specialized or environment-specific training. 
D. SERVICE SELECTION 
As has been alluded to above, and as John Burnam states:  
The dog handler is really an infantryman when deployed to support 
infantry ground operations.  I was a combat infantryman with the 7th 
Cavalry before becoming a war dog handler.  I saw plenty of combat and 
was wounded in combat.  During my second tour in Vietnam as a scout 
dog handler with the 44th Scout Dog Platoon, I relied heavily on my 
infantry combat experience as a scout dog handler supporting infantry 
ground operations.  It worked and I survived along with my dog.  After 
basic dog training has been completed at the dog training center, I think 
the dog team should be shipped to an infantry unit for further training.  
This would familiarize the infantry unit with the purpose and use of a dog 
team as well as the dog team with the infantry unit’s make up and 
operational capabilities. (questionnaire response, September 30, 2005)   
If infantry is the future “environment” in which the dog will work then this is who 
should help train the dog.  Or, as Kiernan Holliday points out: 
Of course, the Marines and the Army use the dogs for different work than 
the Air Force does.  It simply makes sense to train the dogs and the 
handlers for the mission.  A basic familiarization course for all services to 
teach the handlers how to deal with the dogs is probably necessary.  
Looking back on it, that was what the Sentry Dog Handler Course did. 
(questionnaire response, September 11, 2005) 
Again, much of this is a matter of common sense and, as remarked on by Bill 
Riley:  
A sentry dog is a sentry dog.  I trained platoons of both Army and Marines 
in scout dog deployment.  The dogs were implemented in the same way.  
The specific needs of a Navy SEAL could be quite unique and not 
common to other services.  If there is a specialty, the best trainers are 
people with operational experience and understanding of the unique 
requirements within that discipline. (questionnaire response, October 7, 
2005)  
E. FURTHER RECOMMENDATIONS 
The following are my recommendations based on the research conducted for this 
thesis.  These recommendations do not take into account the expenditure of resources 
required, and each is intended only as a point for further consideration and research. 
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1.  The current DoD dog program must include more extensive scenario-based, 
realistic training.  Nothing is more important as far as former handlers are concerned.  
The scenario-based training has to be based on a system that includes feedback from units 
that have been to combat to ensure that units in the combat areas get what they need and 
adjustments are made as the threats change. 
2.  The DoD MWD Program must incorporate an After Action Review (AAR) 
Report.  The report should be simple while providing information that can be used to 
evaluate the effectiveness of the current use of dogs in combat.  This data can be used as 
future justification for expanding particular programs or modifications to programs.  
Currently, no formal system is in effect to collect data.  The one page AAR forms used in 
Vietnam had more potential than was realized at the time—and are worth a close look 
today.  The Vietnam Scout Dog Program at Fort Benning used these AAR forms to adjust 
training if certain trends became apparent via the reports.   
3.  The DoD MWD Program should make Lackland AFB the repository for all 
military working dog information.  A library to collect military manuals and documents 
and civilian publications on working dogs should be created and maintained.  The ideal 
solution would be a web-based library to be maintained by Lackland AFB, accessible to 
all current and former handlers.  Such a library would provide a “reach back” capability 
to handlers who are deployed.  A bulletin or message board would also be tremendously 
helpful.   
4.  The DoD MWD Program should maintain a database listing former and 
current handlers, similar to the database that already exists for its dogs.   
5.  The DoD MWD Program should consider using former handlers from Vietnam 
and others with combat experience to proof, vet, and validate the training currently being  
conducted or developed.  The Vietnam War dog handlers have a wealth of experience 
and many would be willing to give the program their honest, candid recommendations 
and evaluations.   
6.  The DoD MWD program should incorporate Mobile Training Teams (MTTs).  
The MTT personnel would be educated in the latest training, techniques, and procedures 
(TTPs) and lessons learned from units in Iraq and Afghanistan.  The MTTs could then 
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share these with the field units and Kennel Masters to ensure that everyone has the latest 
information, as well as serving as points of contact for “reach back” at Lackland AFB.  
The MTTs could also help guide greater baseline standardization. 
 7.  The DoD MWD program must increase its efforts to educate the leadership of 
the supported units.  This must start at the patrol leader level and work to the highest 
levels of leadership.  Increased awareness will only enhance the program’s ability to 
justify increases in manpower and funding.  The greater awareness there is among the 
leadership, the more such awareness will enhance the effectiveness of the dog teams 
since the leaders will have a greater appreciation for their capabilities and limitations.   
Spivey suggests that:  
Large majorities of the MWD Handlers are young, junior enlisted Soldiers 
that typically do not have the experience level that is required to brief 
commanders and operational planners on what their capabilities and 
limitations are, thus we have teams that are being mis-utilized and/or 
underutilized.  Example – A Patrol/Explosive MWD team being used 
exclusively at an access control point and not being used in a direct 
combat or combat support role….MWD course students must be trained in 
a realistic fashion and must be educated on how to “Sell” themselves to 
their commanders.  Proper use of MWD teams must be taught at all 
NCOES and Officers Training Courses; if officers and NCOs are given a 
brief understanding of the roles that an MWD Team can perform and 
given guidance on how not to use the teams, I believe this will go a long 
way in helping the program to grow and become stronger.  (Response to 
questionnaire received on October 12, 2005) 
The program could develop its equivalent of “mod-demo teams” (in US Army 
Special Forces).  The teams could be comprised of retired dogs and handlers with the 
mission to educate leaders throughout the military.  The use of retirees would then allow 
for demonstration for education purposes while not pulling current dog teams from 
training or operations.  Also, the dog program could develop videos to be shown at the 
various Services’ leadership courses.  These videos would educate the junior officers and 
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APPENDIX A:  THE GUIDE FOR TRAINING OF SCOUT DOG 
PLATOONS FROM THE OFFICE OF SENIOR ADVISOR 
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APPENDIX B:  THE PERSONNEL LISTING FOR THE 26TH IPSD 
































THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 
93 
APPENDIX C:   THE REMAINING PORTIONS OF OPERATIONAL 
READINESS TEST USED AT FORT BENNING, PROVIDED 




































APPENDIX D:  JOINT IED DEFEAT TASK FORCE 
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APPENDIX E:  QUESTIONNAIRE FOR FORMER HANDLERS AND 
CURRENT MWD PERSONNEL 













DOGS OF WAR:  THE USE OF DOGS ON DISMOUNTED PATROLS 
by 
 
MAJ Michael L. Hammerstrom 




Please Return Responses by Oct 10, 2005 
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ABOUT THE QUESTIONNAIRE 
 
The purpose: This questionnaire will allow me to collect responses from former and 
current military working dog handlers, in order to determine candid perceptions of 
various handlers and the effectiveness of dog teams in combat environments.  The 
point of the exercise to produce a collection of responses that may be used to further 
develop the military working dog programs. 
 
The intent:  The intent of using a questionnaire is to allow the handlers to respond 
candidly, in order to produce the best conclusions and recommendations possible.  
 
The questionnaire will be used only to determine general trends or to determine 
specific areas that may require further research or inquiry.  No names will be used 
or connected to the responses to this questionnaire.  If you would like to have your 
responses attributed to you, please check the appropriate space and include your 
name on the questionnaire.  The responses will be reviewed only by me, MAJ 
Michael Hammerstrom.  The responses will be used as a source of data for analysis 
for my thesis at the Naval Postgraduate School. 
 
Please respond in the spaces provided, as they reflect your expertise.  Do not feel 
limited by the space provided.  If completed in “hard” copy, you may use the back 
of each sheet or insert additional pages, identified by question number.  Please 
thoroughly explain your responses so that someone with limited understanding of 
military working dogs can understand your main points.  The questions are not 
meant to be offensive or insulting to anyone or to a specific organization, they are 
attempts to create points of discussion and exploration.  There are four short pages 
of questions numbered three to six. 
 
Please respond by October 10, 2005 using any of the following methods: 
 
Mail:  MAJ Michael Hammerstrom 
  
 
Email:   
 
Phone:   
 
**Note:  The phone response method is the least preferred, but is available if you 
have any questions or concerns about this questionnaire or other methods of 
response are unavailable to you. 
Your participation is greatly appreciated.  Without your expertise and cooperation 








1.  Do You Wish to Remain Anonymous?   Yes_____, No_____ 
 
If No, then Name_______________________________________________________ 
 




3.  Military Working Dog Expertise:__________________________________________  
      
________________________________________________________________________ 
 
     Have you been in a combat environment as a member of a dog team?_________ 
 
     Afghanistan? ___ Iraq? ___  Philippines? ___  Korea? ___  Vietnam? ___  Other?___ 
 
4.  Do you feel that the current DoD Military Working Dog Program is adequate for the 
missions being required of the dog teams in military operations?    Please indicate     YES        
or         NO. 













6.  What type of program or course should or could be added to enhance the effectiveness 







7.  What would be the ideal training requirements for dog handlers for today’s 









9.  Do you believe that the current procurement process provides an adequate quality of 




10.  Do you believe that the current method of handler training produces handlers with 
adequate expertise to deploy immediately upon assignment to a unit following instruction 
at Lackland AFB?  _______ 
 
11.  Do you feel that you were adequately prepared when you attended your training 
courses?___ 
 
12.  What aspect of your course do you feel made the most impact on your first 





13.  Do you feel that the Services should be able to develop their own specific dog and 






14. Do you believe that current programs using dogs for IED detection are training the 






15.  Do you understand the products and training requirements of the SSD program? 
_________ 
 
16.  Do you believe that commanders or patrol leaders understand the proper utilization 
of dog teams? 
_______________________________________________________________________ 
 
17.  How many times did you, as a handler, and your dog conduct live fire exercises with 
an infantry unit?  ______ 
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18.  How often did you conduct road marches of more than six miles with your dog? 
______ 
 
19.  Did you fire your weapon with your dog within ten feet? _____  How often? 
________ 
       Was the dog working at the time? ______ 
 
20.  How much did your dog weigh? ______   What type of dog? ______What was the 
casualty evacuation plan for your dog if injured in training and in combat, extraction 




21.  Should dogs be used in theater for the duration of the military operations or return 
with each handler on each rotation?  __________________      
        
Why?__________________________________________________________________ 
 




23.  What organizational issues do you foresee with dogs being assigned to Infantry units 
in the Army?_____________________________________________________________ 
 
________________________________________________________________________     
 
24.  Were you and your dog trained for numerous infiltration and exfiltration methods, 
such as helicopter, military or civilian vehicle, dismounted, airborne, rapelling, or 
SPIES?____________ 
 








26. Do you feel that you and your dog were adequately prepared prior to operating in a 
combat situation?  _______ 
 
Who ensured you and your dog were prepared? 
______________________________________________ 
 




What areas  specifically?___________________________________________________ 
 
28.  Do you think that the current training requirements at the DoD Dog Center reflect 
realistic criteria for evaluating the training potential of candidate dogs? _____________ 
 
29.  What roles are dog teams the most effective in the military? 
__________________________ 
 
30.  What is the most effective type or method of reward for a dog? 
_______________________ 
 
31.  Ideally, one would prefer to have a minimal number of criteria which could be used 
as standards for ensuring optimal identification of candidate who have the most training 
potential.  What canine characteristics should be identified as optimal for assessing 




What are the ideal characteristics for handlers?__________________________________ 
 
32.  What do you feel will be the time required to train an off leash dog team with an IED 











34.  Do you believe that dogs used in urban environments must be trained differently than 
those used in a rural environment? ________________ 
 
35.  If a tactical dog program was developed to support primarily the infantry, what 




Where should this training be conducted? ______________________________________ 
 
Who should manage the tactical program? _____ Which Service? _____ Which Branch 
within the Service? ___________ 
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36.  Do you feel that Infantry units would benefit from having organic dog teams 
assigned as part of that unit, at the Brigade or Battalion level? ________________  If not, 




37.  Do you feel that the method of assigning current “patrol” dogs to dismounted patrols 




38.  Can dog teams perform adequately on an urban dismounted patrol?  _______ 
 
39.  Were the latest techniques used by the enemy to emplace and produce IEDs 
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APPENDIX F:  QUESTIONNAIRE RESPONDENTS EXPERIENCE 
The responses from the questionnaire are the following: 
The following are the responses to the questions (1-3) of each individual’s 
experience and expertise yielded the following information reproduced verbatim: 
Former Handlers: 
From the Korean War, Captain Haggerty: currently a civilian dog trainer and 
formerly at the Army Dog Training Center in 1956, Commanding Officer of two Scout 
Dog Units (Fort Benning and Fort Ord), taught the Use of Dog in Plant Security at the 
MP School at Fort Gordon, and worked as Liaison Officer between the US Occupations 
Force, Berlin and the Berlin Police Department.  Mr. Haggerty’s experience is from the 
Korean War. 
From the Vietnam War, there were numerous respondents.  The experience and 
expertise of these individuals in no particular order: 
Robert Crowder: the former Platoon Commander of the 37th Infantry Scout Dog 
Platoon in Vietnam.  He has extensive combat experience in Vietnam.    
Kiernan Holliday: currently a lawyer and a civil engineer.  His MWD experience 
is attendance of the Sentry Dog Handler Course in 1969 and working as a dog handler at 
Cam Ranh Bay Air Base from June 1969 to June 1970. 
William Latham: currently a computer specialist with MWD experience of two 
years as Scout Dog Handler in Vietnam, three years of Narcotics and Bomb Detector 
Dogs, and Kennel Master for the 42nd MP Group FRG. 
Anonymous 1: currently a deputy sheriff and a K-9 handler with the bomb team.  
He has nine years of MWD experience to include combat in Vietnam.  
Stephen Janke: currently a minister and a former sentry dog handler in Vietnam 
and at a Strategic Air Command (SAC) base in Washington State. 
Bill Riley: currently inactive and with experience as a sentry dog handler in 
Okinawa for 14 months from 1965-1966, senior scout dog platoon instructor at Fort 
Benning for 14 months from 1966-1967, and a professional civilian dog trainer and 
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kennel master for six months from 1967-1968.  He did not deploy to Vietnam and has no 
combat experience.  
John Burnam: currently a full-time Senior Technical Writer/Editor for 
Information Technology Corp.  He has authored the books, Dog Tags of Courage and A 
Soldier’s Best Friend.  He is also the founder and chairman of the “National War Dogs 
Monument” and coordinator of congressional legislation on Capital Hill with 
Congressman Walter B. Jones of North Carolina and the his congressional legislative 
staff.  He is featured on a television documentary, “War Dogs”.  His former experience is 
serving as an infantryman in Vietnam with the 7th Cavalry, 1st Cavalry Division and as a 
German Shepherd Scout Dog Handler with the 44th Infantry Platoon Scout Dogs form 
1966-1968. 
Mark Burns: currently a telecommunications technician with past experience in 
the US Air Force Security Police handling Sentry and Patrol Dogs. 
Gene Wimberly: self employed and has experience handling scout dogs for the 42 
IPSD in the 101 Airborne Division during Vietnam. 
Mike Landers: currently working at For Leonard Wood. He has prior MWD 
experience of three years with the Combat Tracker Platoons in Vietnam and two years as 
a Tracker Instructor. 
Perry Money: currently a consulting engineer as a manager of his company’s 
research and development department.  His previous MWD experience includes serving 
as a dog handler with the US Marine Corps Mine and Booby Trap Detection Teams in 
Vietnam, one of the two programs, one Army and one Marine, developed by the BSI 
contractors for use in Vietnam. 
Mike Lister: currently a certified nurse’s aide.  He served two tours in Vietnam as 
a Scout Dog Handler.  For six years he was an instructor/trainer at Fort Benning and for 
four years he was an instructor/trainer at the Lackland AFB.  He also served four years as 
the 1SG at the Army Det. at Lackland AFB.  While working at Ft. Benning he primarily 
worked with mine dogs, but did some work with scout dogs and tracker dogs.  He was 
also involved with the Super Dog Program.   
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Ken Neal: a retired federal employee with 100% DAV.  He was a dog handler 
from 1967 – 1969, worked at the dog school in Okinawa from 1969 – 1970, and then was 
a handler again from 1974 – 1975. 
Current MWD Personnel: 
Gregory Blaylock: currently serving at the Operations Officer, 341 TRS (DoD 
MWD Center).  He has 8 years of experience as a MWD handler and trainer in the 
USAF. 
John Larson: currently the Commander, D Co, 701st MP BN, Lackland AFB.  He 
has 8 years of experience as an enlisted MWD Handler and Instructor MWD Handlers 
course. 
Anonymous 2: an instructor at the MWD Handler course.  He/she has experience 
in patrolling and detection. 
 John Spivey: currently the 1SG, Company D, 701st MP BN – company that 
supports the DoD MWD Training Center.  He has served as a MWD handler 
(patrol/explosive team) from 1988 – 1994, MWD Kennel Master (30 dog kennel) 2000 – 
2003, USAREUR MWD Certification Authority from 2001- 2003, and US Army First 
Sergeant MWD Training Center from 2003 – to present.  Spivey served in Panama as a 
member of a dog team. 
 Robert Norman: currently the Chief for Team 1 in the Specialized Search Dog 
Program.  He has been in the program for over 5 years now.  He started out as a Narcotics 
Dog Handler at Parris Island, SC, and then moved on to a position as Bomb Dog Handler 
as well as the Trainer/Assistant Kennel Master.  He then transferred to Lackland where 
he was a trainer at the Dog Training School.  He then served one year in Iraq as a Bomb 
Dog Handler.   
 Nicholas Fontaine: currently an SSD Instructor.  He has served as a PNDD 
Handler, PEDD Handler, Kennel NCOIC, and an instructor.  Fontaine served in 
Afghanistan as a member of a dog team. 
 Anonymous 3: currently a Military Police Dog Handler.  He has 2 ½ years of 
experience and has served in Iraq as a dog team member. 
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 Jim Pettit: currently a program manager, engineer detection dogs, US Army 
Engineer School.  He has no military working dog experience, but has extensive civilian 
experience with police working dogs.   
 Theodore McCall III: currently an Instructor Supervisor Kennel Master at the 
Trainer Course for the DoD.  He has experience as a Handler of MWD Patrol Explosive, 
Training NCO, Instructor of Handlers and Kennel Masters at all levels of experience.   
He was a Shutzhund trainer before joining the military.  He was Senior of 3 dog teams 
attached to Navy Special Ops in Iraq.  He also has experience as PODUS/VPODUS 
protection, security for United Nations General Assembly 1997 and 2003, Security for 
the Winter Olympics in Salt Lake City, and Security for the Secretary of State. 
 Anonymous 4: currently a bomb dog handler.  He/she has experience as a bomb 
and patrol dog handler. 
 Anonymous 5: currently a federal police officer.  He has 3 years of experience in 
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